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EARLY RETIREMENT INCENTIVES AND
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT
Richard G. Kass*
I.

INTRODUCTION

retirement 1

can be an attractive way for employers to
Early
structure a workforce while providing benefits to the employee.
Through early retirement, an employer can reduce the workforce
without inflicting the pain of mass layoffs, make room for affirmative

action programs or provide promotion opportunities for the young.
The employee can bring a frustrating worklife to a dignified ending,

make a career change without sacrificing financial security or enjoy
a life of leisure while still healthy. For these reasons, early retirement is becoming increasingly common,2 and is occurring earlier and
earlier.3
* B.A., 1982, Yale College; J.D., 1985, Harvard University; Associate, Rains &
Pogrebin, P.C., Mineola, New York.
1. Early retirement is retirement before the mandatory retirement age, usually with
actuarially reduced retirement benefits. Most retirement plans allow voluntary retirement at
age 55, provided the employee has fulfilled minimum service requirements. 2 Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts (BNA) 48:3. The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, as amended in 1978, prohibited mandatory retirement for virtually all employees before
the age of 70. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)(1982) (prohibiting age discrimination); 29 U.S.C. §
631 (a)(limiting protection to those "at least 40 years of age but less than 70 years of age"); 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(prohibiting mandatory retirement age before 70 under a bona fide retirement plan). The most recent amendment to the ADEA eliminated the age limitation of 70
years and prohibits age discrimination against all persons forty years of age and older. Pub. L.
Stat. - October 31, 1986.
No. 99-592, 2. D. MORSE & S. GRAY. EARLY RETIREMENT-BOON OR BANE? 2 (1980) [hereinafter
MORSE

& GRAY]; A. FONER & K. SCHWAB,

AGING AND RETIREMENT

45 (1981); Select Com-

mittee on Aging, 95th Cong., Mandatory Retirement: The Social and Human Cost of Enforced Idleness 9 (1977) [hereinafter Mandatory Retirement]. Between 1970 and 1979, the
percentage of males from 55 to 64 in the labor force has declined from 83% to 73%. The

percentage of females has declined from 43% to 40%. R. CLARK & D. BARKER, REVERSING
13 (1981) [hereinafter CLARK & BARKER]. Accord

THE TREND TOWARD EARLY RETIREMENT

Myers, Why do People Retire from Work Early, 45 Soc. SEC. BULL. 10, 11 (1982). The
percentage of workers choosing to receive their Social Security benefits early has also in-

creased markedly.
3.

CLARK

&

BARKER

supra, at 15.

Mandatory Retirement, supra note 2, at 9.
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Prior to 1978, it was common for employers to impose early retirement plans by mandating the early retirement of certain employees.4 However, in 1978, Congress amended the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act (hereinafter the ADEA) to explicitly outlaw this
practice. 5 Under present law, early retirement must be voluntary.

Despite the 1978 amendments to the ADEA, employers have
been continuing to use early retirement for their workforce-structuring needs by offering certain employees early retirement incentives.
For the purposes of this article, an early retirement incentive is a

one-time lump-sum bonus of a substantial amount of money which is
paid to an employee if she agrees to retire early. Typically, $10,000
is paid to any employee who has reached the age of 55, has at least
ten years of service, and agrees to retire immediately. After age 55
the incentive is typically withdrawn or substantially reduced. 6 Such
4. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1978), which permitted this
practice.
5. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2)
(1982). The entire ADEA is codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634(1982).
6. A standard early retirement clause, from a teachers collective bargaining contract in
Long Island, New York, follows:
"Teachers shall be eligible for a $10,000 retirement incentive provided they meet
the following conditions:
A. The Teacher has been in the employ of the District for ten (10) years or
more.
B. The teacher retires on the July 1st following his/her 55th birthday.
C. Written notice is given to the Superintendent by March 15 of the year of
retirement.
D. Payments hereunder shall be made no later than the first payroll period in
July."
The following variation appears in the Minnesota Statutes Annotated:
"Subdivision 1. Criteria. For purposes of this section, 'teacher' means a
teacher. . .who:
(b) either
(l)(i) has not less than 15 total years of full time teaching service in elementary, secondary and area vocational-technical schools, and
(ii) has or will have attained the age of 55 years but less than 65 years as of the
June 30 in the school year during which an application for an early retirement incentive is made, or
(2) has not less than 30 total years of full time teaching service in elementary,
secondary and area vocational-technical schools.
Subd. 7. A teacher whose early retirement pursuant to this section has been approved by the commissioner of education shall be offered a contract for termination
of services in the employing district, withdrawal from active teaching service, and
payment of an early retirement incentive by the employing school district. An offer
may be accepted by the teacher by submitting a written resignation to the school
board of the employing district.
Subd. 8. Payment; reduction. An eligible teacher shall receive an early retirement
incentive in the amount of $10,000. This amount shall be reduced by $500 for each
year that a teacher is over the age of 55 years to a maximum age of 60 years and by
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incentives encourage early retirement without seeming "involuntary"
within the meaning of the ADEA. Early retirement incentives are
7
most common among public employers, especially school systems,

but their appeal to employers as a "painless" way to restructure

work forces, and their appeal to employees as a valuable fringe benefit make it likely that they will spread into other areas of the economy as well.8
Recently, there have been challenges to early retirement incentives as being in violation of the ADEA and corresponding state age

discrimination laws. Employees who are either too old or too young
to receive the incentives have claimed that their civil rights have

been violated. 9 So far, early retirement incentive plans have been
an additional $1500 for each year that a teacher is over the age of 60 years. The
age of the teacher shall be determined as of the June 30 in the school year during
which the application for the early retirement incentive is made.
Subd. 9. Desegregation districts. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision 8, an
eligible teacher who is employed by a school district which is implementing a desegregation plan ordered by federal court or approved by the state board, and who is
offered and accepts an early retirement incentive contract pursuant to subdivision 7,
shall receive an early retirement incentive in the amount of $15,000. This amount
shall be reduced by $750 for each year that a teacher is over the age of 55 years to
a maximum age of 60 years and by an additional $2250 for each year that a teacher
is over the age of 60 years. The age of the teacher shall be determined as of the
June 30 in the school year during which the application for the early retirement
incentive is made .. "
MINN.

STAT. ANN.

§ 125.611

(West

1984).

These two examples are of ongoing early retirement plans. Early retirement incentives can
also be offered on a one-time-only basis, usually during a reduction in work force. These examples also happen to be open to all employees who meet the plan's age and service requirements.
Early retirement incentives can also be offered to selected individuals only. This latter type of
early retirement incentive would not present any age discrimination problems unless the employees were selected on the basis of their age.
In a sense, any retirement plan which gives larger-than-expected benefits to early retirees
contains an incentive for early retirement. An example would be a plan which gives early
retirees the same annual pension benefits as 70-year-old retirees, without any actuarial reduction. But such an incentive is extremely subtle compared to the lottery-like $10,000 payment
involved in the above examples. For simplicity's sake, this paper will reserve the term "early
retirement incentive" for the types of incentives described in the text, although the subtler
types of incentives may be vulnerable to an ADEA attack as well.
7. See, e.g., MINN. LAWS ANN. § 125.611 (West 1984), excerpt in supra note 6; PhelpsClifton Springs Faculty Assoc. v. Phelps-Clifton, Opinion of General Counsel on New York
State Div. of Human Rights, July 17, 1984; 1983 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 17; 1984 N.Y. Laws, Ch.
665; Bernstein, Retirement Incentive Plans: Do They Work? N.Y. ST. ScH. BD. A.J. 8(1985).
Many retirement incentives for teachers tie the amount of the incentive payment to the
amount of unused sick leave accumulated by the teacher (e.g. $100 for each unused sick day),
thus encouraging good attendance as well as early retirement.
8. See CLARK & BARKER, supra note 2, at 57, which states that early retirement incentives are becoming more and more common. It is unclear, however, if the type of "incentive"
alluded to by CLARK & BARKER isthe same as that discussed in this paper. See supra note 6.
9. Patterson v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 742 F.2d 465(8th Cir. 1984)(plaintiff
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consistently upheld against such attacks. 10 The law, however, is by
no means settled. The attacks on early retirement incentives have
been on unnecessarily narrow grounds and the best arguments
against their legality have not yet been made in court. The opinions
which have been written on the subject have been badly reasoned, or
at best, incompletely reasoned. This article will discuss several possible theories under which early retirement incentives can be attacked
under the ADEA. The article will conclude that in order to achieve
the worthy policy goals which underlie the ADEA, at least some attacks against certain types of early retirement incentives should
succeed.
Briefly, the theories against early retirement incentives are as
follows. First, early retirement incentives arguably violate the ADEA
because they harm older people as a group and society as a whole.
Although they may benefit the individuals who receive them, they
foster ageist stereotypes and reduce participation of older people in
the workforce. Second, by making early retirement artificially attractive, the early retirement incentive is arguably a wolf in sheep's
clothing-it may seem like a lovely fringe benefit at first, but ultimately it may harm the individuals who accept it by diminishing the
length and quality of their lives. Third, early retirement incentives
are arguably a mere disguise for mandatory retirement. No decision
to accept an early retirement incentive is entirely voluntary and uncoerced, because of the power of the incentives and the contexts in
which they arise. Fourth, early retirement incentives may discriminate against those employees too young to take advantage of them.
If the incentives are indeed valuable benefits, then it would seem to
be unfair to deny them to 54-year-olds simply because of their age.
Fifth, they may discriminate against those too old to take advantage
of them. It would appear to be classic age discrimination to deny a
65-year-old a $10,000 bonus to which her coworkers are entitled precisely because she is too old.
If any of these theories is recognized by a court, the employer
may raise several defenses under the ADEA. The employer can argue that any prima facie discrimination is excused by being part of a
too old to receive incentive; challenged under ADEA); Golden v. N.Y. State Employees' Retirement System N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights Case No. 5A-E-A-83-88907A
(1983)(plaintiff too young to receive incentive; challenged under N.Y. Exec. Law S. 296). See
also Phelps-Clifton Springs Faculty Assoc. v. Phelps-Clifton Springs CSD, opinion of General
Counsel of N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, (1984)(declaratory opinion; no complaint
involved).
10. Id.
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bona fide employee benefit plan,"1 or by being based upon a reasonable factor other than age.' 2 The employer can also argue that the
granting of early retirement benefits is necessary to make room in a
workforce for women and minorities and thus avoid Title VII liability. This article will consider these possible defenses as well, and
conclude that none of them convincingly excuse otherwise unlawful
early retirement incentives, either as a matter of policy or as a matter of statutory construction.
The legality of early retirement incentives under the ADEA is a
confusing question to ponder. At one extreme, early retirement incentives would appear to be entirely unobjectionable. The offer of a
$10,000 windfall is a very desirable thing indeed to any employee
who is lucky enough to receive it. Any employee who disagrees that
it is desirable is free to pass up the incentive. An early retirement
incentive certainly seems more humane than the apparent alternative
in a reduction-in-force situation, namely laying off young people who
have no pensions to fall back on. And it only makes sense that incentives are offered to only those employees who are of a certain age.
Younger employees may appear to be entitled to them no more than
they are entitled to pensions or gold watches. And to give them to
older employees would neutralize their value as incentives.
At the other extreme, early retirement incentives appear to be
just as clearly discriminatory, especially to one accustomed to thinking in terms of discrimination law principles. They foster the ageist
stereotype that older people are only fit to be put out to pasture.
They reward only those who conform to that stereotype. To use an
analogy to Title VII, it would be difficult to imagine a court permitting an employer to pay black employees $10,000 to conform to that
group's demeaning stereotypes. Early retirement incentives also drive
members of a protected group out of the workplace. A court would
hardly permit an employer to pay $10,000 to women or blacks as an
incentive to quit their jobs. Finally, they rely entirely upon age classifications, and perform no function which cannot be performed just
as well without doing so. When considering early retirement incentives, it is difficult not to jump back and forth between these two
extremes of finding them to be clearly unobjectionable and just as
clearly discriminatory.
This confusion about early retirement incentives reflects a general confusion in the whole concept of age discrimination. Is the
11.
12.

29 U.S.C. § 623(f(2)(1982).
29 U.S.C. § 623(f(1)(1982).
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ADEA's purpose to protect individuals, older workers as a group, or
society as a whole? Can age classifications be benevolent, or are only
those classifications specifically protected by exceptions to the statute
legal? Is the ADEA directly analogous to the Civil Rights Act of
1964 or is it unfair to compare the two? Is the ADEA meant to
prohibit all discrimination on the basis of age, or just discrimination
against older people? Should the courts protect people from their
own misguided choices, or should they reject such a paternalistic
role? Should they take at face value a claim that a decision was
voluntary, or should they inquire into the complexities of individual
psychology?
Twenty years after the passage of the ADEA,13 these tensions
are still unresolved. Indeed, they are hardly discussed. This is partly
because the ADEA, unlike Title VII, did not grow out of any broad
social movement which can guide a court to the proper interpretation
of the statute. It is also partly because the courts have not yet been
forced to deal with these issues head-on.
The issue of whether early retirement incentives violate the
ADEA forces one to deal with these fundamental tensions in the
law. Difficult cases may make bad law, but they also illuminate underlying principles. Just as the difficult question of affirmative action
makes one better understand the essence of Title VII, so does the
difficult question of early retirement incentives make one better understand the essence of the ADEA. Examining the implications of a
choice between the conflicting arguments and positions on the legality of early retirement incentives can shed light on which of these
basic policy choices is best.
II.

WHY EARLY RETIREMENT INCENTIVES ARE PRIMA FACIE
DISCRIMINATORY

A.

The ADEA Protects Society as a Whole and Older People as
a Group

Early retirement may be good for individual employees and
their employers, but it has adverse effects on the economy as a whole
and on older people as a group. It deprives society of valuable experience and expertise and it fosters ageist stereotypes. When Congress
passed the ADEA, it was concerned with the rights of individuals,
the effects nonemployment of older people had on the economy, and
the effects of ageism on all older people. Early retirement incentives,
which increase the incidence of early retirement, are therefore con13.

The ADEA was enacted by Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967).
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trary to at least some of the worthy policies which underlie the
ADEA and should be prohibited by the courts.
1. Early Retirement Incentives Violate the ADEA's Policy of
Keeping Older People Employed
4
Senator Javits, a primary supporter and framer of the ADEA,1
stated that one of the primary purposes of the statute was to meet
"the danger of [a] tragic waste of one of our most precious resources-the talent and experience accumulated by our older workers over the course of decades."'1 5 The 1965 report of the Secretary
of Labor to Congress which preempted the enactment of the ADEA
noted that age discrimination has an adverse effect on "the economic
system as a whole" because it wastes "a wealth of human resources." 16 Each time the ADEA has been amended, Congress has
reaffirmed this goal of benefitting the economy by keeping older people in the labor force. In 1974, when the ADEA was expanded to
include government employees, Congress quoted, approvingly, President Nixon's statement that age discrimination "denies the Nation
the contribution [older people] could make if they were working."' 7
In 1977, when Congress was considering the 1978 amendments
which banned mandatory early retirement, the Select Committee on
Aging issued a report which stressed the harm on the economy of
early retirement. 18 If the trend toward early retirement continues,
the Committee feared, "we will not be able to afford, culturally, psychologically, or financially, to continue supporting large dependent
populations without serious changes."' 9 The Committee continued,
14. 113 CONG. REc. 31254 (1967)(remarks of Senator Yarborough, floor manager of
the ADEA). Senator Javits also helped frame New York's age discrimination law. Id. at

31253. Every year since 1951 Senator Javits had introduced an age discrimination bill in Congress. Id.

15. S. REP. No. 732, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4(1967)(individual views of Mr. Javits). See
also EEOC v. Curtiss-Wright 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,483 at 34,051 (D.N.J. 1982)
(oral opinion)("The thesis [sic] of the ADEA was to encourage the hiring of older workers").

But cf. Senator Yarborough's comment that "[i]t is not the purpose of this bill to extend the
normal working life of our citizens." 113

CONG.

REc. 31252 (1967). These interpretations are

not necessarily inconsistent, since the word "normal" was probably used by Senator Yarborough in the sense of "unabbreviated," not in the sense of "statistical average."
16. The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment: Report of the
Secretary of Labor to the Congress under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

2,5(1965) [hereinafter The Older American Worker]. The report noted that the goals of helping the economy and of protecting individuals may sometimes conflict. Id. at 2.
17. H.R. REP. No. 93-913, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974); 1974 US. CODE CONG. ADMIN. NEWs 2849 (quoting President Nixon's message to Congress on March 23, 1972).
18. Mandatory Retirement, supra note 2, at 23.
19. Id.
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"[e]ach year as thousands of people are encouraged or forced to retire, their skills, knowledge and wisdom are lost and their opportunities to instruct, teach, consult or advise, listen and reflect, as well as
to work, are cut off."20
As the 1977 study of the Committee on Aging suggests, the economic advantage of encouraging the employment rather than the retirement of older people is no mere makeweight argument in favor of
the ADEA or its constitutionality. Independent studies have concluded that this policy is crucial to the health of the national economy.21 "Older persons withdrawing from the labor force decrease the
number of taxpayers and increase the number of beneficiaries," thus
straining the already-strained federal budget and the economy.22 As
retirement ages go down, the public cost of supporting the retired
increases dramatically2 3 . The early retirement trend threatens to
completely exhaust the nation's retirement resources,24 and so the
government should encourage later, not earlier retirement. 25 This is
especially so given the rapid rise of older people as a percentage of
the nation's population.2"
Although it is undeniable that early retirement is a drain on the
economy, the argument is sometimes made that it is preferable to
the unemployment of younger workers. The economy has a limited
number of jobs, and unemployed younger people are just as much of
a drain on the economy as are retired older people. In as much as
younger people have fewer financial resources-they don't receive
20. Id. quoting from R. BUTLER. WHY SURVIVE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA 65 (1975)
[hereinafter BUTLER]. Note how Congress understands that whether early retirement is forced
or "encouraged," the economic effects are the same.
In a related context, Congress has noted that "noninvolvement [of workers in society]
deprives society of the unique contributions it is possible for older persons to make." H.R. REP.
No. 67, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 15(1975)(supporting the Age Discrimination Act of 1975). The
Committee went on to note that it "wishes to encourage the employment of older workers" in
all federal programs. Id. at 17.
The statutory statement of purpose, though hopelessly ambiguous, is consistent with the
aforementioned legislative history. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) states that it is Congress' intent to
promote the employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age." The clause
"based on their ability rather than age" can be read either as qualifying the whole sentence,
stressing the individual rights aspect of the statute, or it can be read as an additional concern,
stressing the goal of promoting the employment of all older people
21.

(1981).
22.
23.

R. CLARK & D.

BARKER, REVERSING THE TREND TOWARD EARLY RETIREMENT

Id. at 1-8.
Id. at 5.

24. J. GORDUS, LEAVING EARLY, PERSPECTIVE PROBLEMS
PRACTICE & POLICY 2(1980) [hereinafter LEAVING EARLY].
25. CLARK & BARKER, supra note 2, at 7, 63.

26.

IN CURRENT RETIREMENT

Id. at 6-8.
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pensions, for example-there is a certain logic in placing the burden
of unemployment on older people, who supposedly can retire with
relative security and dignity. The flaw in this argument is that it sets
up an unnecessary dichotomy between older and younger workers.

Instead of using age classifications as the only way of determining
who should leave the workforce, less discriminatory alternatives

should be used.17 It would be fairer if wealthy or incompetent employees were chosen as the group to bear the brunt of unemploy-

ment. Such solutions would not involve age discrimination, would not
deprive the economy of its most experienced workers, and would also
28
avoid unfairness to the young.
If the words of the statute allow, the ADEA should be read in
such a way as to prohibit early retirement incentives. Early retirement incentives are harmful to the economy and antithetical to the
statute's purpose of keeping older people in the workforce. 29
2. Early Retirement Incentives Violate the ADEA's Policy of
Defeating Ageism

The ADEA does not just protect individuals and the national
economy; it also protects older people as a group. One of the purposes of the statute is to do away with ageist stereotypes. 30 "The
27. If less discriminatory alternatives can be found to achieve the same goals as a discriminatory policy, they should be pursued. Age discrimination should be avoided if at all
possible. Abermarle Paper Co. v. Moody 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); EEOC v. Chrysler Corp.,
733 F.2d 1183, 1185-86 (6th Cir.), rehearingen banc denied, 738 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1984); B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 393-415 (1976).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 163-176 for a discussion of less discriminatory
alternatives in relation to the "reasonable factors other than age" defense.
It should be observed that if the trends toward earlier retirements, an older population,
and an expanding economy continue, labor shortages may eclipse unemployment as an economic problem.
29. It is true that early retirement does not drain the economy insofar as early retirees
begin second careers. MoRsE & GRAY supra note 2, at 120-21. But at least some early retirees
do not find other employment, id. at 121, as can be expected in an ageist society. If reemployment of older workers were easy, the ADEA would never have been needed in the first place.
When interpreting the ADEA, one cannot assume that ageism is not a problem.
For a discussion of the argument that the "bona fide employee benefit plan" exception of
29 U.S.C. § 623(f(2)(1982) shows a congressional approval of retirement in general, see infra
text accompanying notes 123-181. Briefly, it can be noted here that early retirement incentives
do not fit into any rational definition of a "bona fide retirement plan." Exceptions to remedial
statutes should be construed narrowly, and the remedial portions of such statutes should be
read broadly to effectuate Congressional purposes. E.g., EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board, 565 F. Supp. 520, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Sexton v. Beatrice Foods Co. 630 F.2d 478,
486 (7th Cir. 1980).
30. See Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1983);
Drzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 1983); Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 234 (5th Cir. 1976).
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ADEA is designed to eradicate both conscious and unconscious stereotypes about the abilities of older workers. '3 1 This is in line with
Congress' policy to "combat ageism,"3 2 and with the statute's ex-

plicit purpose of promoting the "employment of older persons. ' 'a
Early retirement incentives should be suspect under the ADEA be-

cause they run counter to its underlying policies of combatting ageist
stereotypes and of promoting the employment of older people. They
are a product of the ageist stereotypes that older people are competent to do nothing but retire. There is little other explanation for

why older employees, rather than highly-paid, incompetent, wealthy,
or junior employees, are chosen for the incentives. Early retirement
incentives also foster ageist stereotypes, by driving older people out

of the mainstream of economic life. These ageist effects of early retirement harm all older people, even if they may benefit the individuals who actually receive the incentives.
Despite these ageist overtones, early retirement incentives are

often viewed as being clearly unobjectionable.3 4 Given that they are
based entirely on age classifications, foster ageist stereotypes, and do
not properly come under any of the exceptions to the ADEA, 35 this
can only be explained by the fact that-American society is profoundly ageist. Despite twenty years of federal age discrimination

law, Americans still tend to take age classifications for granted.3 6 An
31. Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 980 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1981), quoting,
Smith & Leggette, Recent Issues in Litigation Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 41 OHIO ST. L. J. 349, 371 (1980).
32. H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975)(supporting the Age Discrimination Act of 1975).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)(1982). See supra note 20.
34. See, e.g., Rock v. Westinghouse, I MAss. DISCRIMINATION L. RPTR. 1262, 1281
(Mass. Comm. Against Discrimination, 1981), aff'd sub nom., Rock v. Mass Comm. Against
Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 424 N.E. 2d 244 (1981)(considering early retirement incentives so plainly legal that the Commission uses them as the foil of a reductio ad absurdam
argument: if the plaintiffs were to prevail, then early retirement incentives would also be
struck down, and that would clearly be wrong); J. FINGER, AGE DISCRIMINATION PROBLEMS IN
THE CONTEXT OF A REDUCTION IN WORKFORCE 18 (1983)(suggesting early retirement incentives as a way of avoiding ADEA problems).
35. See infra notes 123-180 and accompanying text.
36. Of course, some age classifications are unavoidable. In order to draw a bright line
between children and adults, age classifications are justifiable in determining who may drive,
drink, sign contracts, vote and get drafted. Such classifications really cannot be called ageist,
since they do not affect older people. Age classifications which do not just distinguish children
from adults are less justifiable, since they do foster ageist thinking. This latter type of age
classification, exemplified by social security laws, should be rethought, or at least not taken for
granted. They should be viewed as necessary evils-if they are indeed necessary-and not as
common sense solutions. Compare the attention that sex classifications in insurance contracts
are currently receiving in City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Note, Strategies for the Elimination of Sex Discriminationin Private Insurance, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
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analogy to race and sex discrimination makes the insidiousness of
early retirement incentives clearer.
Although there are no reported cases on the issue, it is difficult
to imagine a court countenancing a plan under which women or
Blacks were paid $10,000 as an incentive to leave their jobs. Despite
the arguable benefits to the individual recipients of the incentives,
such a plan would be seen as being repugnant to the social goals of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 37 Similarly, no court would allow an
employer to give incentives to women or Blacks to conform to their
groups' demeaning stereotypes, and an employer who paid women
factory workers $10,000 to act in a submissive and sexually titillating way would rightly be considered the worst kind of sexist.38
Why is it that when the same option of conforming to demeaning
stereotypes is offered to older people, this is not also considered intuitively to be wrong?
One explanation for why early retirement incentives seem acceptable for older people but not for Blacks or women is that retirement and old age are intimately related concepts. Retirement was
invented precisely for older people, and is defined in terms of them,
and so it is rational to encourage older people to retire in a way that
does not apply to Blacks and women. This argument makes some
logical sense. But from a purely legal point of view, the ADEA specifically deals with the relation between retirement and old age, and
it defines that relation extremely narrowly.39
The only other plausable explanation for why early retirement
incentives should be acceptable even though they foster ageist stereotypes and drive older people out of the workforce is that age discrimination is somehow fundamentally different from sex or race discrimination, and need not be remedied in analogous ways. According to
this view, as long as the individual recipient of the incentive is not
harmed, there is little reason to worry about the negative effects on
older people as a group.
Several authorities have made a case for this point of view. The
REv. 211 (1985).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(l)-(16)(1982).
38. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)(illegal sex

discrimination to force female employee to wear sexually provocative uniform). A $10,000
payoff would arguably make such sexual or racial harassment especially demeaning.

It is probably true that an employer may pay employees to conform to their protected
groups' demeaning stereotypes if such behavior is a bona fide occupational qualification for the
job. Thus, Playboy "bunnies" may be paid to perpetuate sexist stereotypes. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(2)(1982).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1982). See infra notes 123-180 and accompanying text.
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Secretary of Labor, in the 1965 report to Congress which inspired
the ADEA, asserted that to treat age discrimination as race, religion
or sex discrimination "would be easy-and wrong. . . . [T] here is
an essential difference."'40 This difference, according to the Secretary, is that unlike other forms of illegal discrimination, age discrimination is based not on hate, but rather on ignorance.4 1 People do not
despise or have intolerance for older people; instead, they merely
harbor false assumptions about their ability to work."2 Moreover,
older people are not a physically isolated group.43 They do not live in
ghettos, and everyone is familiar with them. Further, everyone who
lives long enough will become old, therefore, there is little reward in
stigmatizing older people.4 4 Finally, when older people are treated
differently, it is often to their advantage. 45 In the equal protection
case of Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, a the United
States Supreme Court reached similar conclusions.
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly
free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have
been discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin,
have not experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment"
or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. . . .[O]ld age
does not define a "discrete and insular" group. . . in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian process." Instead, it
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal
span.47
It is not difficult to refute these reasons for treating age discrimination differently from race and sex discrimination. First, some of
their factual assumptions are highly questionable. Ageism is not just
based on condescension and ignorance; it is also based on hate and
stigmatization. The term "old fogey" is a common term of opprobrium, and popular comedians get laughs by stereotyping and
40. The Older American Worker, supra note 16, at I.
41. Id.at 2.
42. Id.at 2, 5, 6.
43. Id.at 6.
44. Id.
45. Id.For example, people may be especially solicitous of older people's feelings, and
act more respectfully towards them.
46. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
47. Id. at 313, 314, quoting, Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See
generally Rock v. Westinghouse, supra note 34, at 1278-79; Schuck, The Graying of Civil
Rights Law: The Age DiscriminationAct of 1975, 89 YALE L. 27, 33-38 (1979); Note, The
Age Discriminationsin Employment Act, 90 HARV. L. RaV. 380, 383-86 (1976)(adding the
remarkable claim that older people are not stereotyped).
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ridiculing older people.48 The abuse of older people in nursing homes
is a national scandal, 49 and civic groups strenuously object when
homes for the aged are to be built in their neighborhoods. 50 To the
extent that older people are concentrated in particular neighborhoods and in nursing homes, they are a discrete and insular group.
The fact that everyone will eventually become old actually fosters
stigmatization, since "[o]ur youth culture brings with it a commitment to deny aging . . . . [T]he elderly are an affront to our pretenses of youth. They are what we deny we are becoming. '51 Even
though the young hope to someday be old, it is difficult for them
realistically to imagine themselves as the objects of discrimination
and thus to empathize with them.52
Second, it is difficult to understand why groups that are merely
condescended to should not be as protected as groups that are actively hated. Condescension is arguably even more stigmatizing than
out-and-out hate, since it allows the discriminator to feel good about
himself and hides the nature of the discrimination.
Third, and most telling, most of the arguments for why older
people are not really oppressed would also apply to women. 5 Like
older people, women are not so much hated as condescended to.5
Like older people, women live and work among the rest of society.
Few would argue that for these reasons sexism is to be less vigor55
ously combatted in employment discrimination law than racism is.
The belittling of the grievances of older people is too similar to the
traditional sexist belittling of the grievances of women to take at
56
face value.
48. Tim Conway's portrayal of old people as incompetent and infirm objects of ridicule
on CBS' "Carol Burnett Show" is one example of the scorn accorded to the aged in popular

humor.
49. R. NADER. NURSING HOMES FOR THE AGED: THE AGONY OF ONE MILLION AMERI(1970).
50. Butler, Age-ism: Another Form of Bigotry, 9 THE GERONTOLOGIST 243 (1969).
51. Alexander, Schucking Off the Rights of the Aged: Congressional Ambivalence and
the Exceptions to the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 57 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 1009,
1011(1981); Butler, supra note 50.
CANS

52. L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1077 n.3 (1978), cited approvingly in

Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 113-14 n.1 (1979)(Marshall, J.,dissenting).

53. These reasons have been used to justify the intermediate standard of scrutiny applied to gender based discrimination under the Equal Protection clause. Frontiero v. Richard-

son, 441 U.S. 677 (1973). But under Title VII, women and minorities are similarly protected.
54.

Id.

55. Id.
56.

One argument for treating ageism differently from sexism is little used by legal au-

thorities, but may lie at the heart of many people's willingness to tolerate age classifications.
This argument is that age discrimination, at least in the early retirement incentive context,
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Congress has clearly expressed its intent that age discrimination
be treated analogously to sex and race discrimination. The Select
Committee on Aging, in the report which led to the 1978 ADEA
amendments, concluded that age "should be as protected a classification as race and sex. The argument that everyone ages and no particular group is singled out for discrimination ignores the fact that discrimination solely on the basis of age is wrong." When considering
the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, the House Committee on Education and Labor declared, "Our nation is involved in programs
designed to combat racism and sexism. This Committee believes that
it is equally important for the nation to combat ageism." 588 Congress
also displayed its intent to treat age discrimination on a par with sex
and race discrimination by wording the prohibitions of the ADEA
almost identically to those of Title VII. 59 The only reason why age
discrimination was not simply added to Title VII itself was a fear of
overburdening the EEOC.60
If the ADEA is interpreted analogously with Title VII, then
early retirement incentives should be held to be illegal under the theory that they harm older people as a group by fostering ageism.
There is little objective reason not to treat the ADEA in the same
way as Title VII, and Congress intended them to be treated alike.61
Therefore, early retirement incentives should be struck down under
the ADEA.
only affects relatively well-off workers-i.e. those who are eligible for pensions. These workers
are usually either unionized or in management and do not need the full protection of the law.

Although there is some truth in this, it should be noted that even if victims of ageism are not
the poorest of the poor, they are not excessively wealthy either. Early retirement incentives are

most prevalent in the public sector, where salaries are moderate. The wealthier an employee,
the less likely she is to be swayed by a $10,000 incentive. Moreover, the ban against involun-

tary early retirements does not apply to certain highly-compensated employees who are at least
65 years of age, so that some of the very wealthiest employees are not protected by this part of
the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1982).

Ageism may not be as pressing a problem as sexism or racism, but it is not qualitatively
different from them in any decisive way. Since there is ordinarily no conflict between these
concerns, ageism should be treated the same way under the law.
57. Mandatory Retirement, supra note 2, at 38.

58. H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975). See also the remarks of Congressperson Stephen Solarz on the floor of the House: "Clearly, there is no more room for
discrimination on the basis of age than there is for religious, racial, sexual or ethnic discrimination." 121 CONG. REC. 9231(1975).
59.

Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. and Loan Assoc., 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972),

quoted approvingly in Lauresen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 311 (6th Cir. 1975). Cf. 29
U.S.C. § 623(1982) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1982).
60. 113 CONG. REC. 31254(1967)(statement of Senator Javits). Since 1979, the EEOC
has had jurisdiction over the ADEA.
61. See supra notes 30-60 and accompanying text.
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B. Early Retirement Incentives as Adverse Actions Towards the
Recipients
It is usually taken for granted that early retirement incentives
benefit the individuals who receive them. As long as the incentive is
taken "voluntarily," it seems intuitively obvious that someone who
receives a $10,000 windfall is benefitted, not harmed. If this is true,
then at least from the viewpoint of that individual, there is no violation of the ADEA.
This intuitive assumption may be challenged in two ways. First,
it can be argued that although early retirement incentives seem like
valuable benefits at first, their long-term effect on the "beneficiary"
is actually adverse. Secondly, early retirement incentives are never
really taken "voluntarily" in the truest sense of the word, and they
are therefore a form of coerced retirement. These arguments, however, may do more to further ageism than to abolish it.
1. Early Retirement Incentives as Long-Term Detriments
It is a commonly held notion, shared by Congress, that retirement is bad for one's physical and mental health.62 If this is true,
early retirement incentives are a wolf in sheep's clothing. They appear to benefit the recipients, but in the long run they inflict harm to
them. It is an adverse action to give older workers an incentive that
will likely shorten and worsen their lives.
Despite Congress' views on the subject, most authorities agree
that the "retirement syndrome" is a myth.6 3 Retirement may even
have a beneficial effect on health, especially for those workers who
do physical labor. 4 Most early retirees enjoy retirement at least as
62. "Noninvolvement in our society on the part of older persons leads rapidly to their
physical and mental deterioration." H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 15 (1975) (supporting the Age Discrimination Act of 1975). Mandatory Retirement, supra note 2, at 22.
"Work is important for an individual's physical and psychological well-being." Id. BUTLER,
supra note 20, at 72; quoted approvingly by the Select Committee on Aging in Mandatory
Retirement, supra note 2, at 22. "Men and women who are otherwise perfectly healthy sometimes develop headaches, gastrointestinal symptoms, oversleeping, irritability, nervousness and
lethargy in connection with retirement." Id. at 22.

63. R. ATCHLEY. THE SOCIOLOGY OF RETIREMENT 108 (1976). Even BUTLER, supra
note 20, at 72 agrees that most retirees do not suffer from "retirement syndrome." Id. "On
balance, it would appear that the negative effects of retirement have been widely exagger-

ated." R. ATCHLEY,

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RETIREMENT

108 (1976). The expectation that retire-

ment will be unpleasant and unhealthy may itself be a product of ageism.
64. R. ATCHLEY, supra note 63, at 87. The evidence is not unmixed. There may be a
positive correlation between mental illness and retirement, even if physical health improves,
but this has never been proven. Id. at 107. Early retirees do have a higher mortality rate than
workers of the same age, but this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that bad health
often motivates early retirement. J. GORDus, LEAVING EARLY 55 (1980). There are no studies
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much as they enjoyed working. It is indisputable that retirement
leaves one more time for leisure, hobbies, the development of new
interests, and family life."' Retirement may also reduce stress and
give one a greater feeling of personal autonomy. Most workers look
forward to their retirements, and are happy to retire when they are
financially able to do so.67
Nevertheless, there does appear to be a correlation between unplanned early retirement and later unhappiness.68 A happy and
healthy retirement evidently requires good planning, and time for
mental adjustment to the idea. 9 A truly free choice to retire has also
been linked to happiness and good health in retirement.7 0 A distinction should therefore be made between early retirement incentive
plans which remain constant over a long period of time, so that employees can factor them into their long-range planning, and those
which come suddenly-e.g. in connection with a one-time reduction
in force-and take employees by surprise. The former type of incentive may not be harmful to employees. But when employees are unexpectedly offered $10,000 to retire at the age of 55, the sudden
windfall may be so tempting, plans for retirement so nonexistent,
and crucial information so unavailable that the incentive will be to
the employees' ultimate detriment. The incentive will be a Siren
song that tempts the employee to disaster.
Although there may be some truth to this theory, the paucity of
scientific authority for it and its unabashed paternalism make it a
difficult argument on which to win an age discrimination case. Moreover, the paternalistic standpoint is counterproductive to the larger
battle against age discrimination. The idea that older people's decisions need to be reviewed by the courts for their reasonableness plays
into the ageist notion that older people are mental incompetents who
on the health and happiness of recipients of early retirement incentives, as opposed to early

retirees in general.
65. D. MORSE. A.
FONER

& K.

DUTKA.

& S. GRAY.

LIFE AFTER EARLY RETIREMENT

SCHWAB, AGING AND RETIREMENT 9

RETIREMENT-BOON OR BANE?

(1981); D.

MORSE

xii, 8 (1983); A.

& S.

GRAY, EARLY

65, 80, 85 (1980). The two Morse and Gray studies rely upon

direct inquiry of retirees about how happy they are. Cognitive dissonance and the desire not to
be pitied may help explain why they answered so positively, but these factors alone cannot
fully explain the lopsided results of these studies.

66.

MORSE

&

GRAY,

supra note 2, at 4, 18.

67. Id.
68. J. GORDUS, supra note 64, at 50, 72. There is also a correlation between retirement
that is not fully voluntary and unhappiness. Id. at 4. See infra text accompanying notes 71-90.
69. D. MORSE. A. DUTKA, & S. GRAY, supra note 65, at 135.
70. J. GORDUS, supra note 64, at 56. See infra notes 71-90 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the voluntariness of early retirement incentive choices.
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should be treated as children.
An alternative theory is that the very offering of the early retirement incentive itself constitutes an adverse action against those
employees who refuse it and thus fail to conform to ageist stereotypes. Those employees who refuse the incentive are worse off than
they were before in a very real psychological sense. Such an employee must live with the knowledge that she has passed up a very
large sum of money, and will very possibly experience times of regret
about this important decision. The employee can never return to the
conditions which existed before this tempting choice was set before
her-she must either retire, or continue working with the knowledge
that she gave up $10,000. The original pre-incentive state of innocence can never be regained. In this way, too, early retirement incentives are not benefits but detriments. This argument also has the flaw
of treating older people as children who cannot live with the consequences of their own decisions.
In summary, there are ways in which early retirement incentives can be thought of as detriments rather than as benefits to those
to whom they are individually offered. But the paternalism of these
arguments is dangerously close to the paternalism of ageism itself.
The use of such arguments would therefore be counterproductive in
the fight against ageism.
2. Early Retirement Incentives As Not Fully Voluntary
Under the 1978 amendments to the ADEA 71. the "involuntary
retirement" on the basis of age of employees between the ages of 40
and 70 is illegal, unless youth is a bona fide occupational qualification for the job. 72 If retirement pursuant to an early retirement incentive is not truly voluntary, then it is in violation of the ADEA.
On first glance, the acceptance of early retirement incentives
does not appear to raise any problems of voluntariness. No coercion
is involved, and the employee is free to decide either to accept the
incentive and retire early, or to refuse it and continue working. In
economic jargon, the decision to accept an early retirement incentive
is a Pareto gain 7 ---the employee has decided that the $10,000 is
worth more than continuing in the job, and the employer has decided
71. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (0(1)-(f)(2)(1982).
72. The most recent amendment to the ADEA eliminated the ceiling of 70 years of age
and prohibits age discrimination for all persons forty years of age or older. Pub. L. No. 99592, Stat. -, October 31, 1986.
73. A pareto gain is a transaction in which each party is better off than before. M.
THOMPSON. BENEFIT-COsT ANALYSIS FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION 43 (1980).
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that the early retirement of an employee is worth more to it than
$10,000. Each party to the transaction is better off than before, so

there is no reason to suspect that the transaction was not entered
into voluntarily. According to this line of reasoning, encouraging retirement with incentives is qualitatively and fundamentally different
from forcing retirement through coercion. A carrot is not the same
74
as a stick.
However, there are several ways in which the decision to accept
an early retirement incentive can be seen to be not fully voluntary,

and hence the product of an ADEA violation.7 5 First is the easy case
in which the employer exerts coercive pressure on the employee to

accept the "incentive." In such a case, the early retirement incentive
plan does not stand on its own; it is accompanied by a clearly illegal
adverse action by the employer. "[T]he underlying atmosphere is
like the army joke-volunteer or else." 6 When this is the case, there
should be no doubt that the ADEA has been violated. 77 Not only
employers, but unions and peer pressure may also coerce employees
into accepting early retirement.7 8 The implication inherent in an
74. This conclusion is often taken for granted. In Coburn v. Pan American World Airways, 711 F.2d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 488 (1983), the court declared
that early retirement incentives are "a humane practice well accepted by both employers and
employees," and would seem to support "not a hint of age discrimination." In EEOC v.
Chrysler Corp., 546 F. Supp. 54, 76 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd, 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 738 F.2d 167(1984), the court stated without any discussion that if the defendant's
policy of encouraging early retirement through increased fringe benefits had been "followed to
the letter, no discrimination occurred." The court in Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901, 905
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1977)(result reversed by 1978 amendments to ADEA),
declared that "[w]hile discharge without compensation is obviously undesirable, retirement on
an adequate pension is generally regarded with favor." Accord Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1982). One commentator suggests the use of early retirement incentives precisely because they are "truly voluntary," without discussing why. See J.
FINGER,

supra note 34, at 19.

75. See the EEOC's interpretations of the ADEA, which fails to deal head-on with the
issue of early retirement incentives: "Neither section 4(0(2) nor any other provision of the
[ADEA] makes it unlawful for a plan to allow individuals to elect early retirement at a specified age at their own option." 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(0.

76.

BUTLER,

supra note 20, at 70.

77. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chrysler, 546 F. Supp. 54, 69 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd, 733 F.2d
1183 (6th Cir.), opinion on rehearing, 738 F.2d 167 (1984); Toussaint v. Ford Motor Co., 581
F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1978); FINGER, supra note 34, at 103; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

519 (1983)("If pressure, subtle or otherwise, is used to en-

courage 'voluntary' retirement, liability may result"). See also Tribble v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 669 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983)(early
retirement taken "under protest" is not voluntary).
78. BUTLER, supra note 20, at 73 (one employee "feels that his retirement was forced
but it was ostensibly voluntary; i.e. he wanted 'to give younger men a chance.' Now he regrets
his decision.").
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early retirement incentive offer that the targeted employee is not really needed or wanted is a coercive element present in every early

retirement incentive, especially when it is offered to an employee,
individually, rather than as part of an ongoing plan.
When an employee does not have a reasonable expectation of
job security, the effect is similar to the "volunteer or else" situation.
In a reduction in force, for instance, the employee may see her

choice as either accepting the incentive and retiring early, or being
laid off anyway without any bonus payment. In such cases, it is irrelevant whether or not the employer has made explicit coercive threats
about the consequences of not agreeing to retire early. The situation
itself is coercive enough. 79

Even in situations where there is no hint of coercion from either
the employer or the situation, the voluntariness of early retirement

incentives may still be doubtful. "[D]ifferences in treatment might
make early retirement so attractive, or continued employment past
[an early] retirement date so onerous in comparison, as to generate
the real world equivalent of mandatory retirement at that [early]
date."80 A tempting carrot can compromise voluntariness just as
79. See E. HEIDBREDER, Cancelled Careers: The Impact of Reduction-In-ForcePolicies
of Middle-Aged FederalEmployees: A Report to the Senate Special Committee on Aging 15,
31 (1972) (discussing an early retirement plan that did not contain any special incentive). In
Tribble, 669 F.2d at 1195, the court held that early retirement is not taken voluntarily when
the only other choice seems to be a discharge without any benefits at all. This situation should
be distinguished from the situation in which an employee has already been individually chosen
for a discharge on grounds other than age, and is then offered generous early retirement terms.
In such a situation, the voluntariness of the early retirement is irrelevant, since the termination
decision is not based on age. Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 410 n.4 (9th Cir.
1981); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1982)(also relying
on plaintiff's admission in a desposition that his choice to accept a generous early retirement
plan was made "of his own free will").
80. Monroe v. United Airlines, 569 F. Supp. 645, 649 n.5 (N.D. I11.
1983)(dictum). The
court went on to say that "[t]his case does not require a decision as to whether and where such
a cutting edge might be found." Id. The Monroe court was discussing the setting of early
"normal" retirement dates, but the same logic holds, even more strongly, to early retirement
incentives. See also Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 410 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981),
where the plaintiff argued that early retirement incentive "carrots" worked hand-in-hand with
coercive "sticks." The Sutton court did not reach this argument.
In the words of another court, "[r]ealistically, an employee's decision whether or not to
forego lucrative benefits funded in part by employer contributions he would not otherwise receive, is not 'voluntary' in the sense we think it would have to be in order to find a waiver of
statutory protection." McMann v. United Air Lines, 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976). Although
this decision was reversed, on other grounds, in 434 U.S. 192 (1978), Congress vindicated the
Fourth Circuit's decision by enacting the 1978 ADEA amendments. See also Campbell v.
Connellie, 542 F. Supp. 275 (N.D.N.Y. 1982)(employee who "freely" chose a retirement plan
that offered greater benefits but forced retirement at age 55 over a plan that offered lesser
benefits but allowed retirement at age 70 has not waived his ADEA right not to be retired
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much as can a threatening stick. No one would argue that a schoolteacher had a realistic choice to refuse the offer of a million-dollar
early retirement incentive, and no one would argue that a high-paid
executive had no choice but to accept a hundred-dollar one. The
question is where to draw the line, and the courts are competent to
make such a determination. If a reasonable person in the employee's
position would not be able to resist a $10,000 windfall, then that
early retirement incentive should be considered to be involuntary,
and in violation of the ADEA.
It is not just the size of the incentive which determines its voluntariness; the nature of the job is also crucial. 8 ' A relatively smaller
incentive might be irresistable if the job is especially unpleasant, and
a relatively larger incentive might be easy to turn down if the job is
a highly desirable one.82 Employees who accept an early retirement
incentive in part because of "job dissatisfaction [and] a perceived
lack of employment-related rewards" do not make a truly voluntary
decision." 83 The employer has just as much power over the relative
attractiveness of continued employment as it has over the relative
attractiveness of the monetary incentive.8 The attractiveness of continued employment should be factored into any analysis of whether
an early retirement incentive is too good to voluntarily refuse.8 5
The most significant evidence in any such determination will be
what percentage of the employees pass up the incentive. If even one
employee refuses the incentive, that will be powerful evidence that
there was no real-world equivalent of mandatory retirement. On the
other hand, if every single employee of a large sample accepts the
early, where the choice was made before the ADEA covered that employee). Contra, Bouflier
v. Frank, 389 F. Supp. 502, 505 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)(decided before the 1978 ADEA amendments). The 1978 amendments to the ADEA prohibit mandatory early retirement pursuant to
a pension plan even though most pension plans are entered into in an ostensibly voluntary way.
An incentive need not be "the real-world equivalent of mandatory retirement" for it to be
in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 623(f(2)(1982). This section forbids "involuntary retirement"
(emphasis added) which might be construed to mean any retirement which is not fully voluntary in the narrowest sense of the word. Thus, the strict requirements for the doctrine of
constructive discharge need not be met for a retirement to be illegally involuntary. See, B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 611 (1983) for a discussion of
the constructive discharge doctrine.
81. MORSE & GRAY, supra note 65, at 2-3, 20.
82. Id.
83. J. GORDUS, supra note 64, at 4. These employees were also less likely to enjoy their
retirement.
84. Id. at 34.
85. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. One of the conditions of continued employment will always be the unpleasant nagging knowledge that a valuable financial opportunity has been passed up.
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incentive, that will be evidence that the incentive was for all practical purposes impossible to refuse. It should be remembered, however,
that the statute does not just ban "mandatory" retirements, but all
"involuntary" retirements.8 6 Some retirements may be "involuntary"
even if they are not quite mandatory.
Although this argument is couched in terms of the voluntariness
of the recipient's decision, it is not really concerned with the recipient's rights. From the recipient's point of view, the more generous
the incentive is, the better it is. But from the point of view of the
voluntariness argument, the more generous the incentive is, the
worse it is. The argument that early retirement incentives are not
truly voluntary if they are overly attractive thus boils down to a doctrinal, statutory means to accomplish the independently-valid policy
goal of abolishing early retirement incentives. The real policy concern is not whether the recipients' free will is impaired, but whether
early retirement incentives foster ageism, or hurt the economy, or
discriminate against those who are ineligible to receive the incentive.
If early retirement incentives were held to be illegal because involuntary, it would not be the first time in the law that incentives
were recognized as being inherently coercive. There are many instances where courts have equated the carrot with the stick. Under
the National Labor Relations Act, it has been held that an employer
who promises a shorter workweek and higher wages if the union
loses the certification election is unfairly coercing its employees.8 7
Any time the law imposes a limit upon the workings of a "free"
market, it is forbidding a seeming Pareto gain, either because one
party is really being disadvantaged or because the public interest is
being harmed. One person's "incentive" is another person's "bribe,"
and the law constantly distinguishes between the two.88 The intent of
an employer who offers an early retirement incentive is to reduce the
number of older workers, 9 and since this goal is contrary to Con86. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1982).
87. Darby Cadillac, 169 N.L.R.B. 315 (1968). Cf. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375
U.S. 405, 409 (1964)(granting benefits to employees shortly before a certification election is a
"fist inside the velvet glove" which impinges upon the employees' freedom of choice, since

there is always an implied threat that the employer will not be so generous if the union wins).
88. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Similarly, an employer would be barred
from giving an "incentive" to female employees who agree "voluntarily" to submit to sexual
relations, even if there is no implied threat of any adverse action if the employee refuses. 29
C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a)(1985). It is true that part of the reason for this rule is to avoid the risk
of an obnoxiously sexist work atmosphere. But early retirement incentives analogously raise
the risk of an obnoxiously ageist work atmosphere (though the analogy is admittedly inexact.)

89.

If this were not the employer's intent, less discriminatory means of achieving its

goals would always be available. See infra notes 164-187 and accompanying text.
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gress' intent in enacting the ADEA, early retirement incentives
should be treated more like bribes to circumvent the law than like
incentives to do a harmless thing.
Even if by any of the above arguments early retirement incentives are seen to be not fully voluntary, it does not necessarily follow,
by sheer logic alone, that they should be prohibited. It is in the very
nature of free will that all choice is structured to a greater or lesser
extent. All decisions are made in the context of a real world which
makes some choices more attractive than others. Despite the language of the statute, the question is not whether early retirement
incentive decisions are completely and utterly "free" in some abstract sense; rather, the question is whether these decisions are free
enough. Courts have broad leeway to answer this question, and their
judgment will be made on the basis of intuitive feelings about the
meaning of the ADEA, and the facts of the particular case.90
As with the question of whether early retirement is really a benefit or a detriment to the employee, the problem arises of whether
the courts should decide whether or not an older person's decision is
truly voluntary. This paternalism smacks of the very ageism sought
to be eliminated. Although there may be some merit in the argument
that early retirement incentives can never be truly voluntary, the paternalism involved in this view, and the strange way in which more
attractive incentives are treated as being somehow worse for the recipients, make it a problematical point of view on which to rely.
C. Early Retirement Incentives As Adverse Actions Towards
Younger Employees
The ADEA protects all employees aged 40 and above.9 1 If an
early retirement incentive is offered only to those employees who are
55 years old, and if an early retirement incentive is indeed a benefit,9 2 then employees who are between the ages of 40 and 55 may
have a cause of action, since they are being denied a benefit solely on
93
the basis of their age.
90.

Insofar as a court holds that an early retirement incentive is involuntary within the

meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1982), the exception contained in 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1982)
may apply. That section permits the compulsory retirement of 65-year-olds who are bona fide
executives or high policymakers and who are entitled to pensions of at least $27,000.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)(1982). See supra note 72.
92. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
93. Employees under the age of 40 are similarly aggrieved, but they have no cause of

action under the ADEA or any other federal statute. About half the states have statutes which
protect employees under the age of 40 as well. 8A LABOR REL. REP. (BNA)(Fair Employment
Practices Manual) 451:102-451:104. However, insofar as the early retirement incentive is part
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Such an action may seem counterintuitive at first. The ADEA's
purpose is to "promote the employment of older workers. .... 1194 It
seems strange to allow people to sue under this statute because they
are too young to receive a particular benefit, even if they are within

the age group protected by the statute.
9 5 is
Rock v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination

the only reported case that squarely faces this issue. In Rock, an
employer offered extracontractual early retirement benefits to former

employees who had been over the age of 55 when their plant was
closed. The employer did not offer such benefits to similarly situated
employees who were between the ages of 40 and 55. The court held

that this did not violate age discrimination law. 96 The court reasoned
that the purpose of age discrimination law is to help older workers
who are "being discarded for younger, more vigorous men and
women," not the other way around, and called its interpretation of
the law "common sense and practical. 97 The agency decision which
the Rock court upheld summarized this doctrine nicely. Once past
the age of 40, reasoned the Massachusetts Commission Against

Discrimination,
a person is protected from disparate treatment that favors younger
workers. One is not, however, . . . entitled to benefits or privileges
equal to those afforded older workers. Expressed in the vernacular,
the statutory scheme is a "one-way street" that protects older
workers from discrimination in favor of younger ones, but not vice8
versa.9
of an "employee benefit plan," state law is preempted by 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(1982) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85
(1985); Champion Int'l. Corp. v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1984).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (b)(1982)(emphasis added).
95. 384 Mass. 198, 424 N.E.2d 244 (1981).
96. The court was interpreting Massachusetts age discrimination law (MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 151B § 4(1)), but this statute is directly analogous to the ADEA in all relevant
respects. 424 N.E.2d at 247.
97. 424 N.E.2d at 246-47. The court also relied on three other reasons for its holding,
none of which are very convincing. First, it held that no harm was done to the younger employees just because a gratuitous gift was given to some older employees. Id. at 247. But any
favorable treatment denied only to members of a protected class can be excused in this way.
Second, the court held that since it is a violation of the law for 55-year-olds to be replaced by
40-year-olds, 40-year-olds are not as protected under the law as 55-year-olds are. Id. at 248.
The logic of this reasoning is difficult to discern, since whether the hiring of 40-year-olds can
be a part of a 55-year-old's grievance is a totally separate issue from whether 40-year-olds can
have grievances of their own. Finally, the court holds that the employer's action was based on
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose of pleasing the union. Id. But any discriminatory
action which favors workers whom the union also happens to favor would be excused by this
reasoning.
98. Rock v. Westinghouse, Mass. Discrimination L. Rptr. 1262 (1979), aff'd sub nom.
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Portions of the legislative history of the ADEA support the pro-

position that the statutory scheme is a "one-way street." The Secretary of Labor's 1965 report to Congress described the age discrimination problem entirely in terms of misconceptions about the
abilities of older workers, not in terms of the evils of age classifications per se. 99 When President Johnson recommended the ADEA to
Congress, he stressed the obvious fact that age discrimination intensifies as employees grow older. 100 Such concerns lead to the conclusion that favoring the old over the young is not the equivalent of
favoring the young over the old.

The ADEA itself permits an employer to "observe the terms of
a bona fide seniority system," which by its nature favors older workers over younger ones. 11 Seniority systems are based upon years of
service rather than on age per se, and so early retirement incentives
do not fall within this provision. The seniority system exception does,
however, show some Congressional willingness to allow older employees to be treated more favorably than younger ones.

Congress' willingness to allow retirement benefits to vest only
after an employee has several years of service 0 2 is further evidence
Rock v. MCAD, supranote 95. Three Wage and Hour Opinion Letters support the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination position. The Department of Labor had jurisdiction
over the ADEA before 1979, when jurisdiction was transferred to the EEOC. When the Department of Labor had jurisdiction, interpretive opinions were issued by the Wage-Hour Administrator. Opinion letter 451 advises that a severance pay plan under which employees with
equal years of service received different amounts of severance pay depending on their age at
termination did not violate the ADEA as long as the older workers received greater, not lesser,
payments. "The purpose of the ADEA is to protect the older worker from employment practices which discriminate against him [sic] in favor of younger workers," not the other way
around. Wage & Hour Opinion Letter (BNA(WH-451)(1978), abstracted in EPD (CCH)
para. 618.82, quoted in Rock, supra note 98, at 1280 ["[sic] added by Rock]. Opinion Letter
389 advises that it is permissible for older employees to be placed in preferred classifications,
as long as the classifications are reasonable and the older employees are not forced into those
classifications against their will. The law "is designed to preclude adverse treatment based on
age, and not some additional benefit which will subsequently be available to all other workers
when they reach the age of 55." Wage & Hour Opinion Letter (BNA)(WH-389)(1976), abstracted in EPD (CCH) para. 496.141, as quoted in Rock, supra note 98, at 1280 (misciting
the letter as WH-339). Letter 419 advises that it is permissible to excuse employees above a
specified age from certain undesirable work assignments if they so desire. Wage & Hour Opinion Letter (BNA) (WH-419)(1977), abstracted in EPD (CCH) para. 496.14, cited in Rock,
supra 98, at 1281.
99. The Older American Worker, supra note 16.
100. Lyndon B. Johnson, Pub Papers, Book I at 37 (1967).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1982). 29 C.F.R. § 1625.8(b)(1984) interprets this exception to the ADEA so that seniority plans must favor those with more seniority, not those with
less.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(1982). Although ERISA is subject to the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §
1144(d)(1982), these aspects of ERISA have never been challenged under that statute.
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of its intent to allow older employees to enjoy1 0retirement-related
3

benefits for which younger employees must wait.

Despite the above arguments, there are also some powerful ar-

guments for the position that the ADEA is a "two-way street" in
which 40-year-olds do have a cause of action if they are denied the

early retirement incentives offered to 55-year-olds. The EEOC's official interpretations of the ADEA, following the Department of Labor's old regulations, strongly support the "two-way street" position.

The EEOC declares that "if two people apply for the same position,
and one is 42 and the other 52, the employer may not lawfully turn

down either one on the basis of age, but must make such decision on
the basis of some other factor." 104 The EEOC also would forbid employers from advertising for employees "over 65" or "retired," since
this would "discriminate against others within the protected
group.110 5 Although there are no cases where the court has turned to
these interpretations, they make sense and are entitled to deference
by the courts.106
There is legislative history in support of the EEOC interpretations. Senator Yarborough, the floor manager of the ADEA in the
Senate, stated that if a 42-year-old and a 55-year-old were applying
for the same job, neither one could be turned down on the basis of
age. 107 One district court case, in dictum, also supports the EEOC.
103. Several courts, without being faced with this issue, have implicitly assumed that
the ADEA only protects employees from discriminatory actions taken against them because
they are too old, not because they are too young. In Loeb v. Texton, 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 n.9
(1st Cir. 1979), the First Circuit admits that an employee who is replaced by an older person
may have an ADEA action, but only because "[tihe older replacement could have been
hired. . .[merely] to ward off a threatened discrimination suit." It does not occur to the court
that replacement by an older person on the basis of age is in itself a cause of action. Smith v.
World Book-Childcraft Int'l., 502 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. II!., 1980) is a similar case. See also
Moore v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 464 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ca. 1979)(plaintiff has a cause of
action if replacement is younger than plaintiff).
104. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a)(1986)(emphasis added); accord 29 C.F.R. § 860.91(b)

(1985).
105. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.4(a)(1986).
106. E.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 1983);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). The commentators agree that the
EEOC interpretations open the door for younger workers to challenge preferences given to
older workers. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 485 (2d ed.
1983) W. DEIDRICH & W. GAus, DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS § 6.02 (1982) at
145-46; A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 3 § 98.52; EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION 1
§ 16.03. Larson expresses doubt whether these regulations are consistent with the purpose of
the ADEA," (§ 98.52) as does the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination in Rock
v. Westinghouse, supra note 98.

107.

113 CONG. REc. 31,255 (1967).
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In Hays v. Republic Steel Corp.,10 8 in dictum, the court stated that
"there can be [illegal] discrimination if you favor a fifty-three year
old over a forty-four year old, if based on age." In a 1969 opinion,
the Acting Wage-Hour Administrator advised that a specification in
a want ad for applicants over the age of 50 was illegal, since the
ADEA prohibits "discrimination against anyone within the protected
group." 109 In a 1971 opinion, the Administrator ruled that an employment agency may not refuse to help people below the age of 55,
since it is unfair to give preference to "one group of 'older' workers
over another group which is equally entitled to the protection of the
0
law."911
An analogy to Title VII also supports the EEOC's "two-way
street" interpretation of the ADEA. An employer would not be able
to favor darker skinned Blacks over lighter skinned Blacks, even
though the former may be more subject to discrimination than the
latter. Similarly, an employer should not be able to favor older over40-year-olds over younger over-40-year-olds simply because the former are more a part of the protected group than the latter, and suffer more severe discrimination. Admittedly, this analogy is inexact.
Lighter-skinned Blacks do not become darker-skinned Blacks and
40-year-olds become 55-year-olds. Unlike race, age is a progressive
condition, and so it makes sense to treat age on a sliding scale in a
way that does not make sense for race. Those who do not receive
incentives because they are too young need only to wait a few years.
Nevertheless, unless an early retirement incentive is part of an ongo108.

12 Fair Empl. Prac. Case (BNA) 1640, 1647 (N.D. Ala.1974), affid in part and

rev'd in part on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978). The count went on to note,
however, that the fact that a younger person is not being favored over an older person is
evidence that age was not the motivating factor behind the employer's decision. Id. at 1647.

109. Opinion of Acting Wage-Hour Administrator Ben P. Robertson, January 7, 1969,
reprinted in 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 401:5221.(Date)

I10. Wage & Hour Opinion Letter (WH-113), Jan. 19, 1971, reprinted in 8 Lab. RI.
Rep. (BNA) 401:5232.(Date). These opinion letters antedate the ones cited for the contrary
position in supra note 98. Two State law cases also implicitly subscribe to the "tworway
street" model. In McLean Trucking Co. v. State Human Rights Appeal Board, 80 A.D.2d
809, 437 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1st Dept. 1981), appeal dismissed, 53 N.Y.2d 103, 425 N.E.2d 885,

442 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1981), the court upheld the claim of a 23-year-old who was not hired because he was below the minimum age of 24, without explaining why this constitutes a claim or

discussing the merits of this aspect of the case. In Ogden DBA Lucille's Hair Care v. Bureau
of Labor; 68 Or. App. 235, 682 P.2d 802, 37 CCH EPD 135, 405 (1984), aff'd, 229 Or. 98,
699 P.2d (Or. 1985), 37 CCH EPD 135, 40 (1985), the court held that under the plain lan-

guage of Oregon's antidiscrimination statute it is illegal to discriminate against an applicant
because she is too young for the job. This issue was not litigated on appeal. Both the New

York and Oregon statutes protect all those between the ages of 18 and 40, in addition to those
40 and older.
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ing plan, and unless there is substantial job security, there is no reason to think that younger workers will eventually receive the benefit

if they are only willing to wait long enough. If the incentive is offered as part of a one-time reduction in force, or if there is substantial employee turnover at the relevant ages, the progressivity of age
does the 40-year-old employee little good.
The most convincing reason to support the two-way street the-

ory is that it makes it possible to eliminate all unnecessary age classifications from unemployment decisions, regardless of who appears

to be benefitted by them. The elimination of unnecessary age classifications would help eliminate ageist ways of thinking and the dis-

crimination which results from such thinking. It would also foster
individualized, merit-based employment decisions, rather than group
decisions based on arbitrary classifications.111
Even though the EEOC does subscribe to the "two-way street"
interpretation of the ADEA, that agency leaves a loophole which

may allow for favoritism towards older workers in many situations.
In an interpretation that has not yet been cited by any court, the

EEOC states, under the heading "discrimination between individuals
protected by the [ADEA],"1l2
the extension of additional benefits, such as increased severance
pay, to older employees within the protected age bracket may be
lawful if an employer has a reasonable basis to conclude that those
benefits will counteract problems related to age discrimination. 113
1 14
Since age discrimination worsens as the individual grows older,
favored treatment to departing older workers can often be justified
by this rationale of counteracting problems related to age discrimi-

nation, despite the two-way street rule.11 5 But this loophole for favorI11. In race and sex discrimination law, the complete elimination of suspect classification is impossible because of the continuing need for affirmative action programs. Although
age discrimination is qualitatively similar to race and sex discrimination, it is not so severe a
problem, and so affirmative action is arguably unnecessary. At a minimum, it has never been
seriously advocated, Therefore, age classifications can be abolished in a way in which race and
sex classifications cannot.
112. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1983).
113. The section concludes, "the extension of those additional benefits may not be used
as a means to accomplish practices otherwise prohibited by the Act." 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(b)
(1983).
114. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
115. For example, the employer would be justified in giving an extra $10,000 to departing 55-year-olds because they would be less likely to find a comparable job as quickly as a 40year-old would.
Under the EEOC's approach, the burden of showing the reasonableness of the favored
treatment of older workers would apparently fall on the employer. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(b)
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itism towards older employees does not apply to early retirement incentives. Fifty-five-year-olds are not offered early retirement
incentives in order to counteract problems related to age discrimination; they are offered incentives so that they will leave their jobs. It
is only because they will leave their jobs that any problems related to
age discrimination may arise for these employees (i.e. if they try to
find work elsewhere). Early retirement benefits create age discrimination problems; they don't counteract them. The EEOC regulations
allow special benefits for older employees who are leaving their job
for some independent reason. 16 It has no relevance to the situation
where additional benefits are given to older employees precisely in
order to encourage them to retire. Despite the regulations, the
EEOC's vision of the ADEA has no room for early retirement incentives which are not offered to protected employees because they are
too young.
It is impossible to choose between the one-way street and the
two-way street approaches in an a priori way. The fundamental nature of the ADEA must be examined, and basic policy choices must
be made. If the ADEA is essentially a way of helping older people
vis-a-vis younger people, then the one-way street theory of Rock v.
MCAD should prevail, and early retirement incentives should withstand attack from those whose grievance is that they are too young
to receive them. If on the other hand the ADEA has the broader
purpose of fostering merit-based employment decisions by eliminating age as a legitimate classification, then the EEOC's two-way
street theory should prevail, and all early retirement incentives
which are not offered to forty-year-olds should be struck down.
Which vision of the ADEA is most in tune with Congressional intent
and which would be most beneficial to older people and for society
are debatable issues. It is largely a matter of choosing either the
short-term protection of older individuals, or the long-term elimination of ageist thinking from the world of employment. The debate
cannot be avoided if early retirement incentives are vigorously challenged in the courts.
appears to contemplate a case-by-case analysis of whether the extra benefits to older employ-

ees will counteract age discrimination. For example, an employer would probably not be justified in giving additional severance pay to 60-year-olds if those 60-year-olds had valuable skills

that were in such demand in the marketplace that age discrimination would be less likely to
hinder their search for substitute employment. Because of its case-by-case, functional ap-

proach, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(b)(1983) does not adopt the "one-way street" theory, even in its
practical effect.
116. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(b)(1983).
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D. Early Retirement Incentives As Adverse Actions Towards
Older Employees
The most obvious way in which early retirement incentives violate the ADEA is that they are offered to 55-year-olds but not to 65year-olds. Some people are not offered incentives precisely because
they are too old. 117 Just as an employer would not be allowed to deny
65-year-old employees a ten thousand dollar bonus that younger employees receive as a bonus for their youth, an employer should not be
allowed to deny 65-year-old employees a $10,000 early retirement
incentive simply because they are too old."18
This argument is especially compelling when the early retirement incentive is offered by the employer only once, as a one-time
method of reducing the size of a workforce. In such cases, the employee who is too old to receive the incentive never had an opportunity to receive one. The terms and conditions of the older worker's
employment are thus clearly inferior to the terms and conditions of a
younger worker's employment.
The argument is more difficult to make, however, when the employer has a continuing early retirement incentive plan which is offered each year to all employees who turn 55 years old in that year.
When this is the case, the employer may quite convincingly argue
that those employees who are too old to receive the incentive have
already had their opportunity to receive one, but have freely chosen
to pass it up. All employees have the same terms and conditions of
employment-they may choose to retire at age 55 with $10,000 extra, or they may choose to work longer without any such bonus.
Older workers in such a situation are not being discriminated against
because of their age per se, but rather because of their voluntary
decisions to pass up an opportunity." 9 Far from being discrimination, it is simple fairness to make an employee adhere to the consequences of her own fully-informed choice. The ADEA is not meant
to, and should not, protect employees from the fact that time passes
and cannot be recaptured. There is no law against making decisions
117. See supra note 6 and accompanying excerpts of the early retirement incentive
plans.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)(1983) states that "[iut shall be unlawful for an employer to
. . . discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."
119. Another way of expressing this thought is to say that all older employees are not
harmed by their inability to receive early retirement incentives; only those employees who want
to reverse their previous decisions are harmed.
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irreversible120 and to say that older people should not be bound by
their previous choices smacks of the ageist assumption that older
people are mentally incompetent and must be treated as children.
such a way as to eliminate
Age discrimination law should be used 12in
1
such stereotypes, not to further them.

It may be concluded that those employees who have passed up
the offer of an early retirement incentive should not be heard to

complain of age discrimination when they no longer have the opportunity to receive the incentive. However, any employee who never
discriminahad such an opportunity has a very strong claim of age122
age.
of
because
one
receive
to
eligible
not
is
tion if she
III.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES UNDER THE

ADEA

Once a court decides, on the basis of one or more of the theories
discussed above, that an early retirement incentive plan is a prima
facie violation of the ADEA, the employer may raise one or more
affirmative defenses. If any defense is successful, the early retirement incentive will be upheld.
There are three defenses which may be applicable to early re-

tirement incentives. The employer may argue that it is only following
a bona fide employee benefit plan, and so it is protected by the statutory exception of section 623(0(2) of the ADEA. The employer may

argue that its decision was based on a reasonable factor other than
age, and so it is protected by section 623(0(1) of the ADEA. Lastly,

he may claim that the granting of early retirement incentives is necessary to make room for women and minorities to avoid Title VII
liability. As the following discussion will suggest, these defenses cannot justify early retirement incentives.
A.

Early Retirement Incentives Are Not Bona Fide Employee

120. See EEOC v. Air Line Pilots' Assoc., 661 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1981)(discrimination
in favor of early retirees in regard to vacation benefits is legal, as long as all employees had the
chance to retire early with the same terms). See infra note 165 and accompanying text for a
refutation of the argument that discrimination against people who are too old to be eligible for
the incentive is justified by the employer's desire to create an incentive to retire quickly.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
122. Even if an employer has offered early retirement incentives for the past hundred
years, an employee may still complain of age discrimination if she was hired when she was too
old to ever receive one. But one court has held that even those employees who never had an
opportunity to receive an incentive do not have a valid claim of age discrimination. Patterson
v. Independent School Dist., 742 F.2d 465, 468 (8th Cir. 1984). See also Cipriano v. Bd. of
Educ., 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986), 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355,356 n.2 (1986).
However, this holding relies upon the case's chief holding, criticized infra text accompanying
notes 144-161, that early retirement incentives are exempt from the ADEA.
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Benefit Plans
Section 623(f)(2) of the ADEA states that "[i]t shall not be
unlawful for an employer

. . .

to observe the terms of.

.

.any bona

fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this
Act."' 23 The only reported cases which deal directly with the legality
of early retirement incentives under the ADEA hold that such incentives fall under this exception to ADEA coverage, and are therefore
legal.124 These holdings display a fundamental misunderstanding of
the bona fide employee benefit plan exception.
1. The Purpose and Mechanics of the Exception
In order to understand why the bona fide employee benefit plan
exception should not apply to early retirement incentives, one must
first understand what that exception was meant to accomplish. Section 623(f)(2) was not meant to weaken the ADEA's policy of encouraging the employment of older people; rather, it was meant to
strengthen it. There is no good reason to interpret this section in
such a way as to allow employers to rid themselves of older workers.
Congress' intent in passing the bona fide employee plan exception was to prevent the employment of older workers from becoming
prohibitively expensive, and thus to foster the broader goal of keeping older people in the work force. 25 The House Committee on Education and Labor stated, "this exception serves to emphasize the primary purpose of the bill-hiring of older workers-by permitting
employment without necessarily including such workers in employee
benefit plans. 1 26 Senator Javits agreed that the exception prevents
employers from being "discouraged from hiring older workers because of the increased costs involved in providing certain types of
123. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1982). This section concludes, "except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such. . . plan shall
require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual [between 40 and 70 year of
age]."
124. See Golden v. N.Y. State Employees' Retirement System, N.Y. State Div. of
Human Rights Case No. 5A-E-A-83-88907A (August 3, 1983)(unreported decision), and
Phelps-Clifton Springs Faculty Assoc. v. Phelps-Clifton Springs CSD, unreported declaratory
opinion of General Counsel of N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights. See also Patterson,742 F.2d

at 465; Cipriano 785 F.2d at 51. Cipriano, leaves open the possibility that early retirement
leaves may be unlawful if the employer is unable to show that they are not subterfuges to
evade the purposes of ADEA.
125. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., IstSess. 4 (1967). Accord S. REP. No. 723, 90th
Cong., IstSess., 4 (1967).
126. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
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benefits to them."' 27
For example, section 623(0(2) was meant to allow employers to
offer lesser (or more expensive) medical insurance plans to older employees, since these plans cost much more to provide to such employees. To give another example, the exception should be interpreted to
allow employers to give smaller pensions to workers who were hired
at an older age, since employers have less time to set aside money for
pensions for such workers. But by no means should the bona fide
employee benefit plan exception be interpreted so as to allow employers to discourage the employment of older workers by providing
them with expensive incentives to retire which the employer does not
give to younger workers. This is just the opposite of what Congress
wanted to do-to encourage the employment of older workers by allowing employers to give them lesser benefits than younger workers
receive. Such an interpretation would subvert Congress' intent, and
more importantly, it would undermine the worthy policy goals of the
ADEA. 1 28 An early retirement incentive is an employee benefit
which is "a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADEA]," and
29
not "bona fide.'
Despite Congress' clear intent that section 623(0(2) be used to
further the broader purposes of the ADEA rather than to undermine
them, the United States Supreme Court, in United Air Lines v. McMann,130 held that this section allowed the involuntary early retirement of employees pursuant to a pension plan. Congress promptly
overrode the Supreme Court's misinterpretation of the exception by
passing the 1978 amendments to the ADEA. 131 Once again, the legislative history makes clear that the exception's sole purpose is to
keep older people in the work force, not to guide them out of it.132
Of course, the employee benefit plan exception does not allow
employers to reduce all the benefits of older workers. Even though
reducing all fringe benefits to older employees would serve the pur127. S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1967) (individual views of Mr. Javits);
see also 113 CONG. REC. 31255 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits).

128. See supra notes 48-52 for a discussion on why the ADEA's policies deserve broad
and vigorous enforcement.

129.

29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1982).

130. 434 U.S. 192(1977).
131. Act of April 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189, Sec. 2(a). Section 4(f)(2)
of the [ADEA] is amended by inserting after "individual" a comma and the following: "and

no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual. . .because of the age of such individual."
132. Hearings on H.R. 5383 before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on

Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. H2270 (1978)(statement of Congressperson Hawkins
and Congressperson Pepper).
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pose of encouraging employers to employ older people, it would negate the basic anti-discrimination principle which forbids discrimination against "any individual with respect to his compensataion,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's age."' 133 It would be "a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
[the ADEA] .' 134 An employer cannot give lesser benefits to older
people just because of their age. Some correlation between age and
the cost of the benefit must be shown to qualify for the exemption. If
the benefit, for example, medical insurance, costs more to provide to
older people than to younger people, then it is fair to allow the employer to give less of that benefit to older people. Otherwise, older
workers would be more expensive to employ than similarly situated
younger workers. This is the situation that the employee benefit plan
exception is meant to handle. But if the benefit, for example, a fixed
lump-sum payment, costs the same whether it is provided to older
people or to younger people, then it would be rank discrimination,
and a subterfuge of the ADEA, to allow the employer to give it only
to younger workers. Any construction of the exception which would
allow all discriminatory employment benefits to be considered "bona
fide employment benefit plans," regardless of the cost basis of their
discriminatory effects, would swallow up the antidiscriminatory essence of the ADEA. Employers would, for example, be permitted to
cut older workers' wages, or to increase younger employees' wages,
thus subverting the entire statute.
Congress, the Department of Labor, and the courts have all recognized that in order to give content to the anti-subterfuge clause of
section 623(f)(2), actuarial cost data must underlie any application
of the employee benefit plan exception. Congressperson Hawkins
stated that the exception "encourage[s] the employment of older
workers by permitting age-based variations in benefits where the cost
of providing the benefits to older workers is substantially
higher."3 5 Congressperson Pepper noted that any reduction in employee benefits under the exception must have "full economic justification. 1 3 6 The Department of Labor's interpretations state:
[t]he legislative history [of section 623(0(2)] indicates that its purpose is to permit age-based reductions in employee benefit plans
where such reductions are justified by significant cost considera133.
134.
135.
136.

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)(1982).
29 U.S.C. § 623(f(2)(1982).
H.R. 5383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H2270 (1978)(emphasis added).
Id. at H2275. Accord Mamorsky, Impact of 1978 ADEA Amendments on Employee Benefit Plans, 4 EmPLOYEE RELATIONS U. 173, 182 (1978).
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tions. Accordingly, section [623](f)(2) does not apply, for example,
to paid vacations and uninsured paid sick leave, since reductions in
these benefits would not be justified by significant cost considerations. Where employee benefit plans do meet the criteria in section
[623](f)(2), benefit levels for older workers may be reduced to the
extent necessary to achieve approximate equivalency in cost for
older and younger workers. A benefit plan will be considered in
compliance with the statute where the actual amount of payment
made, or cost incurred, in behalf of an older worker is equal to that
made or incurred in behalf of a younger worker, even though the
older worker may thereby receive a lesser amount of benefits or
insurance coverage.137

The Ninth Circuit Court has chosen to follow these regulations,
noting that "Congress . . . meant to encourage the hiring of older

workers by relieving employers of the duty to provide them with
equal benefits-where equal benefits would be more costly for older
workers." 13' Since "severance pay costs no more for a newly hired
older worker than for his or her younger counterpart," the court held
that this benefit cannot be denied to older workers. 139
Some courts have interpreted the word "plan" in the phrase
"employee benefit plan" as meaning something like the complex,
heavily-regulated plans which many employers have for pension and
insurance purposes. Anything short of this is merely an ordinary
fringe benefit, which must be given equally to all employees regardless of age. This interpretation is supported by the statute itself,
which gives the examples of "retirement, pension, or insurance
plan[s]. ' ' 14° Since such plans all base any age discrimination upon

actuarial cost considerations, this amounts to another way of phrasing the requirement that the bona fide employee benefit plan exception only be used to counterbalance higher costs for older workers.
The Fifth Circuit Court, evidently with pension plans in mind, has
held that only those fringe benefits which are part of "a specific and
established 'benefit plan' are covered" by the exception. 141 For this
137. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1)(1983).
138. EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Cowlishaw
v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 450 F. Supp. 148, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (§ 623(0(2) is not meant
to allow employers to cut payroll costs at older workers' expense without actuarial
justification).
139. EEOC v. Borden's Inc., 724 F.2d at 1396. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's
interpretation of these regulations in Cipriano,see infra notes 144-161 and accompanying text.

140. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1985).
141. Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263, 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
975 (1982).
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reason, it struck down an employer's policy of paying accrued sick
leave benefits only to those employees hired before the age of 50.
This "simple fringe benefit," 14 2 which would not have cost the employer any more to give to older-hired workers than to younger-hired
workers, could not be administered in a discriminatory way under
the ADEA. Similarly, the Third Circuit Court has held that lumpsum severance pay which lacks an "age-based cost factor" is "functionally independent" from a retirement plan, and so it may not be
denied to older workers under section 623(f)(2). 43
In sum, the bona fide employee plan exception is meant to encourage the employment of older workers, not to discourage it, and it
only protects those plans which are based on age-related cost factors.
This section cannot be read to embrace early retirement incentive
plans, which discourage the employment of older workers by offering
them extra money, without undermining the whole ADEA. An early
retirement incentive plan is no more of a bona fide benefit plan than
would be a plan which mandated different wage scales for older
people.
2.

The Patterson and Cipriano Decisions

With this understanding of the applicability of a bona fide employee benefit plan exception, it is now possible to examine the two
reported decisions which apply this exception to an early retirement
incentive plan. Patterson v. Independent School District #7091" is

the only reported case which reaches a conclusion regarding the legality of early retirement incentives under the ADEA. Through a
combination of self-contradiction, confused reasoning, and reliance
on irrelevant case law, the Eighth Circuit Court holds that early retirement incentives do fall under the section 623(f)(2) exception to
46 though perhaps
the ADEA. 145 Cipriano v. Board of Education,"
better reasoned, holds that early retirement incentives are bona fide
retirement plans, but does not reach the crucial question of whether
they are a subterfuge to avoid the purposes of the ADEA.
The Pattersoncourt does not deny that the bona fide employee
142. Id. at 1271-72.
143. EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 725 F.2d 211, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 92 (1984). Accord EEOC v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 34 Empl. Prac.
Dec.(CCH) 34,483(D.N.J. 1982)(oral opinion)(severance pay policy is not an employee benefit within the meaning of the statute); EEOC v. Borden's Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1095, 1099 (D.
Ariz. 1982), afd, 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
144. 742 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984).

145. Id. at 468-69.
146.

785 F.2d 51, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355 (2d Cir. 1986).
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benefit plan exception is limited to cases in which "consideration of
age is an actuarial necessity in order to attain fairness in computing
benefits;" in fact, it seems to affirm this basic principle.4 7 Nor does
the Patterson court dispute the proposition that a "separate and independent fringe benefit

. . .

is not exempt as part of an unrelated

retirement or pension plan;" in fact, it defends the Fifth Circuit
Court holding discussed above. 14 8 Instead of disputing the established law on section 623(f)(2), the court restates it on one page and
then completely forgets it on the next, thus arriving at a contradictory conclusion.' 49 After stating the rules, the court neglects to apply
them one way or another. Only through such neglect of the actuarial
necessity principle is the court able to hold that early retirement incentives are exempted from the ADEA by the employee benefit plan
exception.
The only support which the court gives for its holding is a citation to the McMann case, which Congress overrode, 150 and a discussion of an irrelevant Fifth Circuit Court case, Mason v. Lister.15 ' In
Mason, the plaintiff challenged a federal retirement plan which allowed early retirement without any incentives during a reduction in
force. No benefit outside of the basic retirement plan was involved,
and the court upheld the plan. It is difficult to see how the Patterson
court considered Mason to support the legality of early retirement
incentives, which are a benefit independent of the basic retirement
52
plan.
147. Id. at 467 (qualifying this statement with an unexplained "perhaps").
148. Id. In a footnote, (n.3, at 467), the court champions Atford, supra note 141 but
criticizes Borden's, (supra note 138). The court distinguishes these two cases from each other
by noting that in Afford the fringe benefit was granted to those eligible for retirement, and in
Borden's it was granted to those ineligible for retirement. The court reasoned that the Borden's benefit may be interpreted as an "integrated feature" of a retirement plan, compensating
ineligible employees for missing out on retirement benefits. It is unclear how this makes the
benefit more integrated with the pension plan than if the benefit went to the employees who

were eligible for retirement. Regardless of how convincing the court's logic is on this point, the
early retirement incentive is clearly analogous to the Alford case, since it is paid only to those
employees who are already eligible for retirement benefits. Since the court defends Alford,
which holds that § 623(0(2) does not apply, one would think that it would hold that the early
retirement incentive is not an integrated part of a retirement plan, and thus not covered by the
bona fide employee benefit plan defense.
149. Id. at _
.
150. See supra notes 130 and 131 and accompanying text.
151. 562 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1977).
152. Insofar as the Mason retirement plan allowed early retirement without actuarially

reducing pension payments, that plan was admittedly not perfectly based upon cost factors.
But no plan is perfectly cost-based in every detail. The point here is that the plan in Mason

was basically a conventional retirement plan. Early retirees were paid less per month in pension benefits than older retirees, since they could be expected to live longer. The early retire-
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It must be concluded that although Patterson is the only reported case which arrives at a conclusion concerning the legality of

early retirement incentives, it should be accorded little precedential
value. It is badly reasoned and self-contradictory. There is nothing in

the opinion which would distinguish the case from one in which an
employer had a "plan" in which all older workers were forced to
take a ten percent cut in pay or all younger workers were given a ten

percent bonus in pay. If the court had used the tests which it says
are to be used, it would have held that early retirement incentives

are not protected by the section 623(f)(2) exception, since: (a) the
age discrimination which they involve is not based on cost factors,
since a lump-sum payment costs the employer the same amount to

give to employees of all ages, and (b) they are separate fringe benefits independent of the retirement plan. If the court had been consis-

tent, it would not have come to the perverse result that a plan whose
sole purpose is to reduce the number of older workers is excused

under an exception meant to encourage the employment of older
15 3
workers.
Ciprianov. Board of Education is the only other reported case

which discusses the applicability of the bona fide retirement plan exception to early retirement incentives. 54 Cipriano holds that early

retirement incentives are bona fide retirement plans within the
meaning of section 623(f)(2) of the ADEA, but leaves open the
question of whether they are subterfuges to evade the purposes of the
ADEA within the meaning of that same section.' 55 Therefore, it does
ment incentive plan in Patterson,which gives a large bonus to 55-year-olds but not to 65-yearolds, is exactly the opposite of conventional, actuarially-based plan. The decision in Mason
thus sheds no light at all on the correct result in Patterson.
153. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that exceptions to civil rights
statutes are to be read narrowly in order to advance the purposes of the statute as much as
possible. See Sutherland Statutory Construction 3 §§ 60.01, 60.02 (1974); 29 C.F.R. §
860.103(e)(1984). This principle has been uniformly applied to the bona fide employee benefit
plan exception to the ADEA. United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 217-18 (1977)(Marshall,
J., dissenting); EEOC v. Borden's Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1095, 1100 (D.Ariz. 1982), afl'd, 724
F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984); Sexton v. Beatrice Foods, 630 F.2d 478, 486 (7th Cir. 1980);
Marshall v. Eastern Airlines, 474 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D. Fla. 1979); 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a).
This does not just mean that the exception is to be narrowly construed; it also means that "the
burden is on the one seeking to invoke the exception to show that every element has been
clearly and unmistakenly met." 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a). Given these principles, which help
give teeth to civil rights legislation, the Patterson decision is doubly wrong. But cf. EEOC v.
Fox Point-Bayside School Dist., 772 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1985)(characterization of the
ADEA as a "remedial" statute does not invest the Act with a sort of talismanic quality so that
all other canons of statutory construction will be disregarded"). Id. at 1299, n.3.
154. 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986).
155. Id. at 54, 58.
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not reach a definite conclusion as to whether an early retirement incentive plan would in the final analysis be protected from the ADEA
under the bona fide retirement plan exception. Since the subterfuge
proviso is an integral part of section 623(f)(2), the analysis contained in Ciprianois of limited value, although it does suggest that
the court would ultimately lean towards a finding that an incentive
plan is not a subterfuge and thus is lawful. 56
The Cipriano court discusses 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1), but
concludes that that interpretation does not require age-based differences in employee benefits to be actuarially based.157 Instead, it appears to allow benefit levels to vary by age so long as the variations
are justified by some reasonable consideration of the employer's. 158
Thus, since an early retirement incentive will not work unless older
employees receive less, the Cipriano court concludes that such an
age-based benefit variation is protected by the bona fide retirement
59
plan exception.
For the reasons discussed above, such an interpretation of the
exception would wholly emasculate the statute. Any discriminatory
difference in benefit levels could be justified under this reasoning regardless of its effect upon older workers and their participation in
the workforce, since an employer will always have some reason or
other to implement the policy that it chooses. Cipriano'sinterpretation of the section 623(0(2) exception is blissfully forgetful of the
exception's intent. Only in this way can the Ciprianocourt come to
the absurd conclusion that the bona fide retirement plan exception,
which was always intended to keep older persons in the workforce,
can be used to justify an incentive plan which has as its sole purpose
the elimination of older persons from the workforce.
To the credit of the Ciprianocourt, however, the opinion leaves
open the question of whether an early retirement incentive plan is a
subterfuge of the ADEA and thus not protected. 6 ' Had the court
performed this analysis it would have concluded that for a plan not
to be a subterfuge of the ADEA, it must be actuarially based. There
will always be a less discriminatory alternative to a benefit plan
156. Id. at 58.
157. Id. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
158. Id.
159. "An additional incentive for early retirement is generally no more repugnant to the
purpose of § 4(0(2), which is in part to permit employers to offer compensation to older workers who choose to exit the workforce, than any more traditional retirement plan contemplated
by that section. . . The way the plan is structured. . .[does not affect] whether it qualifies
generically for the shelter of § 4(0(2)." 785 F.2d at 55.
160. Id. at 58.
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which is not actuarially based. Therefore, an employer will never be

able to show business necessity, and hence lack of subterfuge, for
such a plan. 1 ' Cipriano's reasoning is incorrect because it is

incomplete.
Despite Pattersonand Cipriano,early retirement incentives can

not be convincingly defended as bona fide employee benefit plans. 6 2
B.

Early Retirement Incentives are Not Based Upon Reasonable
Factors Other Than Age

Section 623(0(1) of the ADEA states that "[iut shall not be
unlawful for an employer . . . to take any actions otherwise prohibited under [the ADEA] . . . where the differentiation is based on

reasonable factors other than age [RFOA]." Although there are several possible ways that employers can try to use this defense to legitimate early retirement incentives, none of them are very convincing.

When a plan is tied to age as explicitly as the typical early retirement incentive plan,163 it is difficult to argue that it is based upon

reasonable factors which are truly "other" than age.
One way that an employer can try to justify early retirement
161. See supra text accompanying notes 125-143. The Ciprianocourt also reasons that
early retirement incentive plans cannot be more repugnant to the ADEA than any ordinary
retirement plan, since both serve the identical purposes of encouraging employees to retire. 40
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 359-60. This reasoning fails to consider the necessarily narrow scope of the section 623(0(2) exception. See supra note 153. It also fails to recognize the
quantative difference between an actuarially-based retirement plan and the huge one-time
windfall of an early retirement incentive.
162. In an unreported decision, The New York State Division of Human Rights has also
held that early retirement incentives are excused as retirement plans. Golden v. N.Y.S. Employees Retirement System, Case No. E-A-88907 (1983); Accord Phelps-Clifton Springs
Faculty Assoc. v. Phelps-Clifton Springs, CSD, declaratory opinion of general counsel of N.Y.
Div. of Human Rights, July 17, 1984. However, these decisions are based not upon the
ADEA's bona fide employee benefit plan exception, but on the more broadly-worded "retirement policy or system" exception of N.Y. Executive Law § 296.3-a (McKinney 1982)
("[N]othing contained in [the N.Y. age discrimination statute] shall be construed. . .to affect
the retirement policy or system of any employer where such policy or system is not merely a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of said [statute]"). Early retirement incentives are more easily considered to be parts of a "retirement policy of system" than "bona fide employee plan[s]
such as. . .retirement, pension, or insurance plan[s]." It should also be noted that the New
York opinions are totally conclusory, without any real discussion of why the exception should
cover early retirement incentives. Of course, the federal case law discussed in supra text accompanying notes 125-143 has no precedential value when interpreting New York State law.
Even though the N.Y. Division of Human Rights opinions are based on a more looselyworded statute, there is still a strong argument that they are incorrect. Early retirement incentives, whose sole purpose is to cut down on the employment of older workers, are "mere subterfuges to evade the purposes of" age discrimination laws. The telltale sign which shows this is
the fact that they are not cost-based. See supra text accompanying notes 125-143.
163. See supra note 6 for an example of a typical early retirement incentive plan.
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incentives under the RFOA exception is by arguing that the discrimination is not based upon age per se, but rather upon ability to bear
the burden of unemployment. Fifty-five-year-olds are the most logical employees to encourage to retire, not because of their age, but
because they are entitled to pension benefits and can better afford to
leave their jobs better than younger employees can. Moreover, employees who are older than fifty-five are not barred from receiving
the incentives because they are too old, but only because the incentive would not be ineffective in encouraging the retirement of the
fifty-five-year-olds unless withdrawn after a short amount of time.
Under this line of reasoning, early retirement incentives differentiate
not on the basis of age per se, but on the basis of the reasonable
factors of ability to afford unemployment and the time dynamics of
incentive programs.
This argument is not convincing. If the employer were really
interested only in the employees' ability to afford unemployment, it
could just as easily offer early retirement incentives to all employees,
regardless of age, and allow those employees who can afford to quit
with the incentive money to select themselves. There is no reason for
employers to assume that only those employees who are eligible for
pensions can afford to retire, especially when pension eligibility is so
closely linked to age.16 4 Similarly, if the employer were really interested in ensuring that the incentives are taken promptly, it could just
as easily set a time limit on the incentive offer.1 5 There is no nondiscriminatory reason for employers to insist that the incentives be
taken at a certain age rather than at a certain date.10 6
164. In EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 92 (1984), the court held that pension eligibility is too closely tied to age to be

a "reasonable factor other than age." Id. at 222-23. Of course, employees who are eligible for
pensions may very well constitute the bulk of those who choose to take advantage of an ageneutral incentive plan.
165. This would work for one-time reduction-in-force early retirement incentives. If an

employer wants to have an ongoing early retirement incentive plan, and wants to ensure that
the incentive opportunity will be so short-lived that eligible employees will have to take advantage of it quickly, the employer may, for example, have a rule that retirement incentives may

be taken only in years that the employee has been working for the company a multiple of ten
years. Less discriminatory alternatives need not be elegant.
166. This discussion illustrates the relationship between the RFOA defense and the concept of the less discriminatory alternative. If a less discriminatory alternative can be found
that achieves the employer's stated goals, then it is difficult to show that the employer's solution was really based upon reasonable factors other than age. If age were not a motivating

factor for the employer, then it presumably would have chosen the less discriminatory alternative. See EEOC v. Chryslerin which the district court speaks in terms of RFOA, 546 F. Supp.
54, 68 (E.D. Mich. 1982), and the Court of Appeals affirms on an argument of less discriminatory alternatives, without noting any disagreement with the lower court. 733 F.2d 1183,
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An employer may also try to argue that its early retirement incentive plan is based upon the reasonable factor other than age, the
reduction of salary costs. Older workers tend to earn more money
than younger workers, and so it is cheaper to have cutbacks fall on
the old rather than on the young. The early retirement of 55-yearolds is in this respect more economically efficient for the employer
than the firing of 25-year-olds. Even when the expense of a ten-thousand-dollar incentive is figured into the calculations, an early retire1 7
ment incentive program may be cost-effective.
This argument is also not convincing. The EEOC's official interpretations of the RFOA exception state that "[a] differentiation
based on the average cost of employing older workers as a group is
unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans which qualify
for the section [623](f)(2) [bona fide employee benefit plan] exception to the [ADEA]."168 The courts have agreed that the high cost of

employing older workers is not an excuse for discriminating against
them."6 Cost of employment is too closely related to age to be considered to be a reasonable factor other than age. Discriminating on
the basis of cost of employment is a mere subterfuge for discriminating on the basis of age.
Finally, an employer may argue that early retirement incentives
are based on the reasonable factor other than age of keeping the
workforce fresh and vigorous. Early retirement incentives help a
company to bring in young blood and ease out dead wood. The problem with this argument is that it boils down to a euphemism for a
desire to commit age discrimination. A desire to employ the young is
inseparable from a desire to avoid employing the old.170
All three of the above RFOA arguments share a common flaw
which reveals another reason why they should not be accepted. No
matter what factor the employer claims it has relied upon to determine who should be eligible for early retirement incentives, the fact
remains that early retirement incentive plans use age as a way of
1185-86 (6th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 738 F.2d 167(1984).
167. This may even be so when the loss of valuable experience of older workers and the
costs of training replacements are taken into account.
168. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(0(1984).
169. EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 546 F. Supp. 54,68 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd, 733 F.2d
1183 (6th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 738 F.2d 167 (1984); Galler v. Markham, 635 F.2d
1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Mastic v. Great Lakes Corp.,
424 F. Supp. 1299, 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
170. J. FINGER, AGE DISCRIMINATION PROBLEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF A REDUCTION IN
WORKFORCE

18 (1983).

Similarly, an employer would not be allowed to discriminate against women because it

wants a more macho workforce.
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differentiating among employees. The employer does not encourage
financially-able employees to retire, or the most expensive employees,
or the least productive employees, but only 55-year-old employees.
The idea that age differentiation can be used as an administratively
easier way of reaching these other groups is repugnant to the
ADEA's basic policy of "prohibit[ing] arbitrary age discrimination
in employment. 171 As the Department of Labor has stated,
To classify or group employees solely on the basis of age for the
purpose of comparing costs, or for any other purpose, necessarily
rests on the assumption that the age factor may be used to justify a
differentiation-an assumption plainly contrary to the terms of the
[ADEA] and the purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differentials
so based would serve only to perpetuate and promote
the very dis1 72
crimination at which the [ADEA] is directed.

For this reason, the EEOC interpretations declare that "[w]hen an
employment practice uses age as a limiting criterion, the defense
that the practice is justified by a reasonable factor other than age is
' 173
unavailable.
To sum up, the RFOA defense should not be available to defend
early retirement incentives for two reasons: first, the "reasonable factors" which are allegedly the basis of any discrimination are too
closely intertwined with age to be considered to be "other than age,"
and second, even if these factors were independent of age, there is no
justification for the use of age classifications rather than a direct re171. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)(1982).
172. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1984), quoted approvingly in Geller, 635 F.2d at 1034
and in Mastie, 424 F. Supp. at 1319. Cf City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)(unnecessary sex classifications violate Title VII).
173. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c)(1984). The court in Patterson v. Independent School Dist.
No. 709, 742 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984) phrased this rule as follows: "[T]he 'factors' rather
than the policy or purpose of the plan constitute the statutory touchstone established in §
623(f)(1)." Id. at 466 n.2. For this reason, the court-which is the only court to ever apply the
RFOA exception to early retirement incentives-held that the defense was not available. In
early retirement incentives, age is the operative "factor," even if fairness, cost savings, or invigoration of the workforce are the ultimate goals. For a further discussion of Patterson,see
supra notes 144-162 and accompanying text.
If the RFOA defense may not be used to excuse age classifications, then § 623(0(1) has
very limited use. The section becomes just another way of saying that actions in which age is
not involved are not prohibited by the ADEA. This is not a flaw, but a virtue of this interpretation of the law. Exceptions to the ADEA should be read narrowly. See supra note 153 and
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(e)(1984). ("[I]n accord with a long chain of decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States with respect to other remedial labor legislation, all exceptions such
as this must be construed narrowly, and the burden of proof in establishing the applicability of
the exception will rest upon the employer. . .which seeks to invoke it").
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liance on the factors themselves.-

4

C. Early Retirement Incentives Cannot Be Justified As
Necessary to Avoid Title VII Liability

Since minorities and women have only recently begun to gain
entry into employment areas which had once been the sole preserve
of white males, older workers in moderate or high paying positions

tend to be disproportionately white and male. If an employer wishes
to avoid liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964175

by hiring and promoting more women and minority workers, then it
may find that an efficient way to make room for these new hirees
and promotees is to encourage the early retirement of older workers.

Similarly, if an employer is reducing its workforce, it may want to
place the burden of this reduction on the older workers rather than
on the least senior workers in order to avoid returning to an earlier
176
era's racial and sexual workforce makeup.
In either of these two situations, the employer may claim a good
defense to an ADEA challenge to the early retirement incentive

plan. The law cannot put an employer in the impossible position of
having to violate either Title VII or the ADEA.17 7 If the two statutes
17 8
conflict, one must give away.

174. The latter reason would not apply to individual, ad hoc early retirement incentive
offers (as opposed to continuing early retirement incentive plans), unless it can be shown that
age was a determining factor in choosing to offer the incentive to the individual in question.
See B.SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 506 (1983)("The cost of
employing an older worker when considered on an individual basis . . . may constitute an
RFOA.").
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1982).
176. See Minnesota's early retirement plan for teachers, supra note 6. Subdivision 9 of
the plan offers an especially large retirement incentive in districts where segregation is a
problem.
177. Senators Javits and Yarborough stated (albeit glibly) on the floor of the Senate
that there is no conflict at all between the ADEA and Title VII. 113 CONG. REc. 31,255
(1967)(the two statutes will "operate completely independently of each other"). Accord H.R.
Rep. 95-527, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1977), ("women and minorities also grow old").
But cf. S. Rep. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 16(1967) (individual views of Mr.
Dominick):
What should an employer or labor union do if it receives applications for the same
position from a Negro woman 36 years old and a white male who is 46. [sic] If they
say they want the younger person, they are open to charges of age discrimination,
and if they take the older, they are open to charges of discrimination on the grounds
of color and sex.
Senator Dominick's example does not disprove Senators Javits' and Yarborough's assumption that Title VII and the ADEA do not conflict. As long as the employer in Senator Dominick's example chooses on the basis of merit, it is not liable under either statute. It is true,
however, that there is no way for the employer to avoid the risk of litigation.
178. See United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209-11(1979)(Blackmun, J.,
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The situation where the employer is forced to initiate an affirmative action program if it wants to avoid Title VII liability is not
uncommon. The burdens which discrimination law places on employers are often very difficult to satisfy, and the best guarantee of safety
from litigation may be a policy of race and sex consciousness in hiring and promotion procedures. 179 But it is difficult to imagine a situation in which such an affirmative action program necessarily conflicts with the ADEA. If the policies of Title VII and the ADEA can
be pursued simultaneously, then neither statute should be
sacrificed.18 0
If an employer wants to make room for an affirmative action
program, there will always be less discriminatory means of doing so
than using an age-based early retirement incentive. One alternative
would be to discharge the least competent employees. Another would
be to discharge the wealthiest employees, who would be best able to
afford unemployment. Still another would be to adopt some random
system of discharging employees, with generous severance pay. Perhaps the best alternative would be to initiate an early "retirement"
incentive system which, unlike those discussed in this article, is not
based upon age. Such a system would offer a $10,000 bonus to any
employee who agreed to resign within the next year, regardless of
age. A variant of such a system would restrict the incentive to employees who had a minimum of five years of service. Another variant
would offer the incentive to all employees who agreed to take the
incentive and resign during any year in which their years of service
were a multiple of ten. Any one of these alternatives would make
room for an affirmative action program without violating the ADEA
or any other law or public policy.
If there were a situation in which the ADEA and Title VII did
conflict unavoidably, there would be a convincing argument that the
ADEA should be the statute which should step aside. Although, as
argued in this article, age discrimination is not qualitatively different
from sex and race discrimination, the fact remains that sex and race
discrimination have left a much deeper scar on American life than
has age discrimination. The broad social movements which inspired
Title VII have no parallel in the history of the ADEA. When there is
concurring)(the law must allow well-meaning employers to take actions to avoid Title VII

liability, even by actions, such as affirmative action, which may in themselves appear to be
discriminatory.).
179. Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945,
954, 1026-27 (1982).
180. See supra note 27.
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an unavoidable conflict, the less crucial statutory policy must be the
one to be sacrificed, and in this hypothetical situation the less crucial
statute would be the ADEA.
But such is not the case. Any conflict between Title VII and the

ADEA stems from a lack of the will or imagination which it takes to
invent non-age-discriminatory alternatives. Age-based early retirement incentives are never necessary for any legitimate business reason. Therefore, since they are discriminatory, and since they do not
fall under any of the statutory defenses to the ADEA, they should
not be tolerated, even for employers who use them to make room for
affirmative action programs.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There are at least five viewpoints to consider when approaching
the question of whether early retirement incentives should be tolerated under the ADEA. From society's point of view, early retirement
incentives should not be allowed since they deprive the economy of
its most experienced workers.' From the point of view of older people as a group, early retirement incentives should not be allowed
since they perpetuate ageist stereotypes, drive older people from the
mainstream of economic life, and unnecessarily use age classifications. 8 2 These points of view have not yet been used in reported legal challenges to early retirement incentives.
From the point of view of the recipients, however, there is nothing wrong with early retirement incentives as long as they are not
accompanied by explicit or implicit coercion. To conclude otherwise
would be to risk the condescension towards older people which is to
be stopped. Still, the arguments that early retirement incentives are
long-term detriments and never fully voluntary may become rhetorical devices to attack the incentives for some other reason than the

welfare of the recipients. 83
From the point of view of employees who are too young to take
advantage of early retirement incentives, they should be struck down
as discriminatory, unless the employees have complete job security.
But it is questionable whether this point of view is valid. The answer
to this question depends upon one's opinion on whether the goal of
individual, merit-based decisionmaking should take precedence over
the goal of allowing favored treatment for the worst victims of age
181.
182.
183.

See supra notes 4-29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30-61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62-90 and accompanying text.
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discrimination. 84
Finally, from the point of view of employees who are too old to
take advantage of early retirement incentives, they should be struck
down as discriminatory, unless those employees have already passed
up an opportunity to receive them."85
In reaching these conclusions, it is necessary to make basic
choices about what the essence of age discrimination policy should
be and about what the essence of the ADEA is. These decisions have
not already been made, because of Americans' ambivalence toward
the concept of age discrimination. But when a dificult problem
arises, such as the problem of the legality of early retirement incentives, choices must be made.
This article has concluded that the protection of older workers
as a group and of society as a whole are integral and valuable goals
of the ADEA, along with the more obvious goal of the protection of
individual rights. Age classifications were seen to be evils in themselves which should be avoided if at all possible. The ADEA was also
viewed to be essentially analogous to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, even if its goals are not quite so urgent. Furthermore,
paternalistic uses of age discrimination law were considered to be
suspect since they carry a taint of the ageism which the ADEA is to
eliminate.
Once the discriminatory nature of age-based early retirement
incentives is made clear, the question remains of whether countervailing policies justify them in the end. Since there are always less
discriminatory means of achieving any legitimate goal which early
retirement incentives may accomplish, their discriminatory effects
are never warranted. 18 Moreover, if the exceptions to the ADEA are
read in such a way that they do not swallow up the rest of the statute, early retirement incentives do not fall under any of these
187
exceptions.
So far, the courts have considered early retirement incentives
only from the point of view of those employees who are too old to
receive them. For misguided reasons, and without regard to the allimportant consideration of whether those employees ever had an opportunity to receive them, these courts have upheld early retirement
184.
185.
186.
187.

See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra

notes
notes
notes
notes

91-116 and accompanying text.
117-122 and accompanying text.
162-180 and accompanying text.
123-174 and accompanying text.
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incentive plans. But if the other possible points of view are considered, especially those of society as a whole and older people as a
group, then early retirement incentives should be ruled illegal under
the ADEA.
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